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ABSTRACT 
The Saskatoon Health Region has initiated a review board to evaluate the effectiveness of 
its relatively new hospitalist program. Under the program, physicians do not keep regular 
office hours for which to see patients. Instead they work out of the hospital and primarily 
care for inpatients. Studies have found this program to increase efficiency in the delivery 
of care in other countries and regions without reducing the quality of the services 
provided, as measured by patient satisfaction, continuity of care, and readmission and 
mortality rates. This thesis examines the hospitalist program’s effects on inpatient length 
of stay, readmissions, and rate of mortality. We find that the additional funding spent on 
the program does not significantly affect patient readmission or mortality rates. However 
there is evidence that the program has increased patient length of stay among those with 
atypically long hospital stays. Over the entire sample patient length of stay is however 
shown to decrease with time implying the physicians are becoming more efficient in 
diagnosis of illnesses and delivery of care, although this result cannot be attributed to the 
hospitalist program. We also identify a reduction in length of stay due to the change in 
physician payment structure, from fixed to fixed plus variable pay among patients with 
typical lengths of stay. Through this reduction in patient length of stay, patient 
throughput can be increased and more patients can receive care in the Saskatoon Health 
Region. 
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CHAPTER 1:  
Introduction and Motivation 
Innovative medical procedures and programs have allowed hospitals to increase the 
effectiveness of the care provided to patients along with increasing the number of patients 
receiving care. One such program is the hospitalist model of physician lead inpatient 
care. The effectiveness of this program has not been evaluated in the Saskatoon Health 
Region (SHR), and thus a care group was initiated to review it. This thesis is part of a 
larger analysis of the hospitalist model. The research will determine if the hospitalist 
program is economically efficient and is providing a net benefit to the SHR. 
A hospitalist is a care provider, most often a physician, who provides inpatient care 
during a hospitalization.  This care provider becomes the patient’s primary care provider 
during their hospital stay until they are discharged back into the community to the care of 
their family physician (Cammarata, 2005).  
Literature suggests that hospitalists are excellent care providers, leaders, and highly 
effective resident teachers. More important, hospitalists have been shown to reduce costs, 
reduce the length of stay, increase patient satisfaction, and provide timely, evidence-
based care. (Dynan et al 2009, Gregory et al 2003, Kuo et al 2010, Lindenauser et al 
2007, Rifkin et al 2004, and Wachter et al 2002) However, most of the evidence is 
derived from data in the United States.  In large part we do not know the effectiveness, 
efficiency, or cost-benefits of Canadian hospitalist programs. 
The hospitalist program at 5
th
 Medicine, St. Paul’s Hospital (Saskatoon Health 
Region) was initially set up as a ‘best practice’ for providing inpatient care. Hospitalist 
programs have been undertaken with success in other regions around Canada and The 
United States. Previously, four general internal medicine (GIM) hospitalist services 
covered 100 patients on this unit in St. Paul’s.  Now, an evidence-based modification to 
include a fifth service of general practitioners (GP) or family physicians has occurred.  
The benefits of adding the GP group are twofold: 1) Appropriate patients can be 
delegated to the GP hospitalist service.  This will free up specialist time in the GIM 
Group; Since GIM hospitalists divide their time between specialist services and 
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hospitalist care, this shift will make that balance more manageable.  2) There is now an 
expanded base of the number of practitioners providing in-hospital services, therefore 
care should be timely, cost-effective, and indicators such as length of stay and mortality 
are hypothesized to be reduced. (Department of Medicine 2008). 
This research thesis will analyze retrospective de-identified patient level data from 
St. Paul’s (and Saskatoon City Hospital as the Intensive Care, Primary Care and the 
Medicine Units were consolidated to St. Paul's from October 2008 to January 2009), 
reporting the data such as length of stay, Resource Intensity Weight (resource usage), 
readmissions, raw in hospital mortality, Case Mix Groups (patient diagnosis and 
severity), patient characteristics (age and gender), and patient demographics, including 
income, socio-economic status, and neighbourhood/ residence. The time period ranges 
between January 2007 to November 2010, and includes data from St. Paul’s and City 
Hospital. The purpose of this research is to identify the hospitalist program’s impact on 
the delivery of inpatient care and to quantify its effects. Hospitalist efficiency will be 
measured by the length of stay and resource usage of each patient case, while the 
readmission and in-hospital mortality rates will measure the quality of care. It is 
hypothesized that this program has reduced length of stay, and the readmission and 
mortality rates. If this hypothesis is supported, funding the hospitalist program at 
Saskatoon Health Region will be shown to reduce direct costs and in combination with 
indirect benefits can result in a positive net benefit.   
Multivariate regression analysis will be conducted on the data to identify these 
relationships, and economic analysis will be run to measure the program effects. The 
dependent variables include inpatient length of stay, the readmission rate, and in-hospital 
mortality. The independent or test variables will be the funding spent on the hospitalist 
program through the Saskatoon Health Region, the date of admission, and the change in 
payment structure. Several control variables will be included in the model such as patient 
characteristics, demographics, and severity of the admitted patients.   
This thesis will support Saskatoon Health Region decision-making; by determining 
whether the benefit associated with the hospitalist program outweigh the costs. This will 
be based on evaluated benefits of the program and particularly patient-centered outcomes.  
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This research will build the body of literature as it will be the first Saskatchewan based 
study of a hospitalist program.  
The thesis will continue as follows: Chapter 2 will provide a description of the 
hospitalist program in the Saskatoon Health Region, followed by literature on the process 
of economic evaluation and empirical studies of other hospitalist programs. Chapter 3 
will address hypothesis development. Chapter 4 will discuss methodology and variable 
selection. Chapter 5 will report the results and findings of the research, and finally a 
conclusion is presented in Chapter 6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
4 
 
CHAPTER 2 
2.1 The Hospitalist Model 
 The Saskatoon Health Region (SHR) has established the Hospitalist Advisory 
Committee, a care group, to conduct a review of the hospitalist program as it stands 
today. This group’s task is to assist the SHR in the decision to continue, alter, and/or 
discontinue the hospitalist program.  
There are several established models of physician care that can be classified as 
hospitalist programs. The most general and widely accepted definition would be: 
The hospitalist is a physician who specializes in supervising patient care during a 
hospital stay; he or she receives the patient from the general practitioner (GP), 
becomes that patient’s primary care physician for the duration of hospitalization, 
and then returns the patient to the care of the general practitioner upon release. 
(Cammarata, 2005) 
This program is commonly recognized to have begun in the United States around 
1996, when Robert Wachter first coined the name, and it has grown tremendously over 
the years to be a common health care strategy in most large cities. A recent study has 
shown that hospitalist programs have grown substantially over the past decade and are 
expected to continue to grow at a rate of 10 to 20% per year (Wachter , 2008). In 
contrast, the Canadian hospitalist program has been around since the early 1990s 
although the exact date and place it began is up for debate and it was never actually 
termed the “hospitalist program” (Redemmeier, 1999). In Canada most hospitalists are 
family physicians who have given up their outpatient practice to focus on inpatient care 
(Maskey, 2008). The hospitalist model was created in Canada to fill the shortage of 
internist specialists in hospitals and care for the patients of family physicians who no 
longer visit hospitals to provide inpatient care to their regular patients. Essentially instead 
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of family physicians traveling from their regular office to the hospital to see one of their 
patients, a hospitalist would be housed permanently in the hospital to provide care and 
take responsibility for these patients (Wachter, 2007b) 
 In the SHR, the hospitalist program was established to take responsibility for 
those patients that would otherwise not have a defined in-hospital primary care physician. 
It was formally established at Saskatoon’s St. Paul’s Hospital on October 1, 2008, and 
consolidated the Intensive Care Unit (ICU), the Primary Care Unit (PCU), and the 
Medicine Unit at Saskatoon’s City Hospital into one facility at St. Paul’s Hospital. It was 
originally proposed that each hospitalist would be required to spend nine consecutive 
hours per day in assigned hospital units providing care for 20 to 25 inpatients and 
performing other duties that benefit and further the operation of the health care facility. 
Other benefits include offering a reliable continuum of care to hospitalised patients; 
strengthening recruitment and retention of staff, increasing access to medical beds for 
inpatients; improving patient throughput; promoting system integration and open 
dialogue; and efficiently deploying system resources. Hospitalists were hired to fill the 
shortages of general internal medicine and family physicians; care for the increasing 
numbers of hospitalized patients that do not have an assigned family physician; and to 
establish a model to formalise the compensation levels by establishing a base level of 
compensation for providing care to inpatients (Department of Medicine 2008). The 
program has recently come up for review to decide upon its future.  
 Rosenthal et al (2009) found acute care practitioner hospitalists provide additional 
benefits to the hospital such as outstanding research programs, quality improvement 
initiatives, teaching and guidance, and patient centred care and/or team centred care 
movements. Scalise (2006) went so far as to recommend that hospitalists’ compensation 
be linked to quality improvements to encourage them to participate in hospital 
committees, information technology projects or quality programs instead of basing pay 
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solely on patient care volumes or productivity. These benefits arise from the fact that 
hospitalists are constantly on call and are able to build their expertise and experiences 
solely on inpatient care at their hospital. This will also allow other physicians to focus on 
areas in which they prefer to practice, thus increasing satisfaction and reducing burnout 
and turnover. Wachter (2001) stated that a hospitalist program can reduce costs and 
length of stay (LOS), improve outcomes, and increase the efficiency of the hospital. 
Further it will attract other primary care physicians (family doctors) to the health region 
who prefer to focus on office practice; this could help alleviate the physician shortage 
faced in many Canadian communities. Mitchell (2008) reports that hospital medicine 
needs to focus on such areas as quality improvement, information technology, 
administration, and research and that by aligning hospitalist incentives with hospital goals 
these improvements can be realized.  
 The scope of the literature on the hospitalist model is divided into the primary 
areas of best practices and recommendations from health care practitioners and 
researchers examining the financial and economic effects hospitalist models have on the 
units and hospitals in which they operate. The vast majority of the empirical papers 
originate out of the United States and either report the effects a hospitalist model has on 
inpatient length of stay (LOS) and direct costs, or compare a hospitalist unit to a non-
hospitalist unit for the sake of economic efficiency, again examining LOS and costs. 
Only one study has been found that examines the effects a hospitalist program has had on 
a Canadian hospital, but it offers more of a hypothetical cost-benefit analysis instead of 
an analysis of the program’s economic effects. This thesis will contribute to the literature 
on Canadian hospital evaluations as well as jointly provide research to aid in the decision 
analysis for the SHR by analysing the impact the hospitalist program has had on the 
economic efficiency of St. Paul’s Hospital. 
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2.2 Economic Decision Analysis 
 Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is a tool commonly used to assess the economic 
impact competing programs will have on an organization. The research question 
examined in this thesis is whether the hospitalist model is economically efficient in the 
Saskatoon Health Region. The alternative to the hospitalist model will be to not run the 
hospitalist program (Brent 2003). The main approaches to CBA in healthcare were 
derived from welfare economics and attempted to calculate the willingness-to-pay of the 
individual for the benefits derived from the product. This was approximated through 
surveys to the public asking the amount of money they would pay for changes in the risk 
of death from various causes, avoidance of injury, and maintenance of good health over a 
period of time (Huhtton 1992).  
When applied to the health care industry CBA, and the similar Cost-Effectiveness 
Analysis (CEA), and Cost Utility Analysis (CUA) (Phelps & Mushlin, 1991), attempt to 
quantify all costs and benefits of the competing programs and recommend the program 
with the highest ratio of net benefits to net costs or the greatest expected percentage 
change (increase) in benefits compared to the percentage change (decrease) in costs. The 
following costs need to be included:  
1. Direct (Salaries and stipend paid to the hospitalist physicians)  
2. Indirect (opportunity costs of the resources used, such as the physicians’ time, 
the unit occupied, and the funds allocated directly to the project.)  
3. Intangible (patient/ physician satisfaction etc.).  
Benefits are also grouped into Direct (increased hospital efficiency through reduced 
LOS, and improved quality of care for patients), and Intangible (satisfaction, turnover, 
etc.) (Muennig, 2008). Adapted forms of CBA and CEA are used when markets produce 
the prices for goods and services that do not reflect the true social opportunity costs. CBA 
attempts to provide a quantitative analysis that is comparable to private sector appraisal 
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techniques. CEA and CUA attempt to measure the program’s effects on the utility of the 
consumer by utilizing quality of life indicators instead of monetary values (Huhtton, 
1992).  
The most important step when applying public investments cost-benefit analysis is 
the selection of projects that are in agreement with the stated welfare function of society. 
So the planner, group or analyst must determine the outcomes to be achieved through the 
execution of the project (Terre et al 1973). In the context of this hospitalist program it 
must be clearly understood that the program was initiated to fill a physician shortage and 
care for unassigned patients rather than to increase hospital efficiency and reduce costs. 
This starting point will guide the analysis towards a qualitative or quantitative focus.  
Often the goal of CBA is to determine the economic efficiency of the project when 
compared to alternatives. Economic efficiency is comprised of two aspects, namely, the 
maximization of the identifiable economic benefit per dollar invested and the 
minimization of the total dollar costs of the project. Essentially the project must have the 
highest marginal benefit with the lowest (or most feasible) cost. Thus the project with the 
greatest economic efficiency will often be the most desirable by society and should be 
implemented (Terre et al 1973). In the United States, this is the most common motive for 
a hospitalist program.  
In the Canadian context, the hospitalist program was primarily established to deal 
with a shortage of family physicians caring for inpatients. Specifically SHR implemented 
this program to “stabilize and improve in hospital patient care, to support the Clinical 
Teaching Units required by the College of Medicine, to enhance the recruitment and 
retention of general internal medicine specialists, and to alleviate the current 
unmanageable workload for the Division of General Internal Medicine, and has 
developed for reasons that include: shortages of physicians in general internal medicine 
and family medicine; increasing numbers of hospitalized patients who do not have a 
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regular family physician; and compensation levels for physicians to provide inpatient 
care.” (Dept. of Medicine 2008). In the Canadian medical sector, capital and revenue 
expenditure decisions are made on the basis of social criteria, not simply on the basis of 
financial returns to the provider and the ability-to-pay of the consumer (Huhtton, 1992).  
The next step in the analysis would be to select a unit of measurement to estimate 
the costs and benefits of each project. There are several problems when choosing a unit of 
measurement which can be addressed from either the factor supply side or the output 
side. As it is common for budgets to be fixed in the present (project expenditures cannot 
exceed the level of funds available), capital rationing is often measured by today’s prices 
and dollar costs. If the projects were to exceed this fixed budget constraint, the project 
would be inefficient and completely infeasible.  Costs and benefits are commonly 
recorded in today’s prices and would require discounting at an appropriate rate (Terre et 
al 1973). Due to the nature of this study and the objectives of the program, the primary 
unit of measurement will be the inpatient length of stay in days.  
Practitioners generally recognize four methods of deriving a discount rate. The first 
is to use the rate of long-term government bonds. Its advantages include that it is simple 
to determine and is not subject to dramatic fluctuations. The second method uses the 
opportunity cost rate which is derived from the value society puts on the funds used for 
the project. This forgone investment opportunity could be recognized by reviewing the 
rates of return attained and expected through private business/security investment. The 
third method refers to the social time preference which is used to derive the interest rate. 
This is the rate the public would use to equate consumption today with consumption in 
the future. Obviously this rate is subjective and difficult to calculate. The final method is 
a combination of the last two. This method would establish some minimum discounted 
cost/benefit ratio for which to grade all projects (Terre et al 1973).   
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When addressing this problem in terms of output of goods and services, there are 
debated lines of thought on how to proceed. One group would equate the prices of 
outputs of public projects to the social marginal costs, which would result in charging the 
recipient of the output (the public) a price equal to the cost of the benefit received. This 
would require price discrimination, and would not be directly applicable to this model as 
public health care eliminates the requirement for consumers to directly pay for care.  
The second group believes in establishing a set of shadow prices to assess the 
public goods and services that do not have a quantifiable market price. When dealing 
with a finite budget for which to fund and operate a system all alternative decisions are 
under scrutiny when one project is chosen over another, as the difference in remaining 
funds can affect the choice of projects into the future. Opportunity costs (or shadow 
prices) should be incorporated into the full analysis to account for both the direct forgone 
costs of the alternative but also the indirect forgone alternative uses that could have been 
undertaken with the funds spent on the original project (Birch et al 1987).However due to 
the constraints in both time and data availability, this all-encompassing analysis goes far 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Generally the incorporation of shadow prices becomes 
difficult when subsequent projects are not readily available to grade.  
The third school of thought involves setting output prices equal to the marginal 
cost, which follows common economic optimization equilibrium. This will involve 
charging all of society the same price per unit of good/ service despite any differences in 
benefits (or utility) they receive. This would be the most appropriate form of pricing 
when dealing with a health care system that is funded and operated publicly (Terre et al 
1973).   
The final step in CBA is to rank the project for comparison and accept the projects 
that achieve the stated social welfare function. This can be simply the project with the 
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highest benefit/cost ratio, and/or the one with the highest marginal benefit to marginal 
cost. This can become exceedingly difficult when intangible costs or benefits dominate 
the analysis (Terre et al 1973).   
When scarce resources are used to fund non-competing or complementary projects 
the decision of which project to undertake must be based on the equivalence of their 
marginal benefits. Thus the benefits acquired from additional inputs must be equal for 
each. But when projects overlap and are not perfectly divisible management must assess 
the projects for increases in benefits relative to increases in costs. This is not always 
straight forward when projects do not produce the same net benefits and their costs differ. 
It is much simpler to judge alternative projects that lead to the same outcomes but require 
different inputs and costs. Yet these inputs and costs will need to be addressed 
individually (Birch et al 1987).  
There are several pitfalls planners must avoid when ranking their projects. The first 
is when analysts become so preoccupied with the quantifiable return rates that the social 
welfare function, which was the basis for undertaking the project, gets neglected. The 
second is the failure to recognise constraints such as political, legal, physical, and 
administrative, and would cause the project to be infeasible. The third deficiency occurs 
when projects are not easily comparable or are not direct alternatives to each other. This 
complexity of shadow prices can dramatically alter the rate of return of the project and 
series of subsequent projects. The final problem arises from the simple, and very crucial, 
choice of the discount rate. An appropriate discount rate must have sound logic and 
history to justify its use. The discount rate becomes more important as benefits and costs 
extend into the future (Terre et al 1973).   
CBA is very sensitive to identification of the project specifications, the positive (or 
negative) benefits and negative (or positive) costs. In the hospital perspective, cost 
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incurrence is often considered a project cost while cost reduction or aversion is 
considered a benefit.  If the total cost of the new project is lower than the current project, 
the difference in costs between the two alternatives could be taken as a benefit to project 
2. The cost of project 2 can also then be taken as is, without adjustment, to account for 
the denominator when running the CBA. Thus care must be taken to ensure that variables 
(such as project costs) are not double counted as affecting costs (and benefits). These 
opportunity costs must be accounted for as either a benefit or a cost, again the 
categorizing of the opportunity cost (as benefits or costs) must be qualified by sound 
judgement and reasoning as they will affect the outcome of the analysis (Birch et al 
1987).   
A number of past health CBA papers have assumed the decrease or reduction in 
costs to be the only benefit they measure and make no attempt to measure the economic 
benefits of each project (such as social welfare). This limits the effectiveness of the 
analysis to cases where the alternative clearly dominates the other through lower costs. 
Despite the obvious difficulty in quantifying the value society will place on a health state 
(sick or healthy), steps must be taken to at the very least to address the intangible costs 
and benefits if only qualitatively (Birch et al 1987). Although this thesis will deal 
primarily on the direct and indirect quantitative costs of the hospitalist program run by 
the SHR, it is an acknowledged part of a larger study that incorporates the qualitative 
intangible aspects of this program. The findings of the interviews and qualitative analysis 
incorporating patient and physician satisfaction and opinions conducted by the Hospitalist 
Advisory Committee cannot be included in this thesis due to confidentiality. 
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2.3 Agency Theory 
In publicly funded health care, physicians are hired by and use the resources of 
the health region on behalf of the tax payer. The physician then acts as an agent on behalf 
of the health region to deliver care and medical services to the public, who indirectly 
owns the medical resources. Fama (1980) examined the efficiency of dividing ownership 
and control for corporations where the firm is defined as a set of contracts or collection of 
individual factors of production, governed by personal motivations, contracted together to 
compete against other teams of contracts. These teams are thus dependent upon each 
other for survival of the team and their personal wealth. In the firm the separation of 
ownership (risk bearers) and control (decision managers) is an efficient form of firm 
structure. Management will be monitored by the managerial labour market. 
 The ownership of the firm is irrelevant to its operations; however there are 
advantages to separating the firms’ ownership and control. Management is a labour type 
that directs the activities of inputs and carries out the stipulations of the agreed upon 
contracts, in general they are the decision makers. Risk bearers are the ones that take on 
the uncertainty of payoffs (revenues minus costs) resulting from the completion of the 
contracts. Usually the risk bearers initially provide the funds to purchase the capital and 
technology needed to carry out the contracts. Thus risk bearing and ownership of the 
assets is one and the same function (Fama 1980). 
 But ownership of capital does not equal ownership of the firm. The firm is simply 
a set of contracts that describes how inputs will be joined to build an output, and how the 
income from sales will be divided. All the factors of a firm are owned by an agent. The 
concept that the firm is not owned by its security holders leads into the idea that firm 
control decisions are not the responsibility of the owners. The manager’s role is 
overseeing and coordinating every contract of the firm, and holds the rights to renegotiate 
individual input contracts. The risk bearer holds the residual claims and the right to sell 
the contractual rights. Labour and management are not the only agents of the firm that are 
presented with a market for their abilities (working for another firm). The owners are also 
presented with a market for their investments. Modern portfolio theory dictates a 
portfolio of diverse and numerous securities. So any one owner may hold dozens or even 
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hundreds of firm’s residual rights (shares or bonds). The owner would then not hold 
particular interest in any one firm or the need to act as the control agent. This risk 
diversification implies a separation of ownership and control (Fama 1980).  
 The managers do substantially depend on the activities of the firm as it is their 
primary income source. Also the manager’s value on the labour market (their reputation 
and ability to be hired at other firms) can be viewed as the value of the firm on the 
securities market. This valuation will act as a control agent for managers (Fama 1980). 
The firm is pressured by the outside managerial labour market to grade and 
reward managers based on performance. Internally managers will tend to monitor each 
other; both top down and bottom up. Each manager is affected by the success of the firm 
and thus each manager is concerned about the performance of the other managers, and 
will monitor their action accordingly. Each manager will be disciplined by his superior; 
the top manager can only be reined in by the board of directors. But since the board 
cannot be made up of owners, due to the numerous and diverse owners who take less 
relative interest in the single firm, the top managers will step in to compete for the board. 
These manager-board members are the most responsible for the firm success and will be 
judged the most severely on the securities and labour markets (Fama 1980). 
To resolve the agency problem of managers not acting in the best interests of the 
owners, Fama (1980) first takes the scenario where the manager is also the sole owner. 
Here the manager will take from the firm until his yield is equal to the marginal expected 
utility of a dollar used to consume or invest outside the firm. As he is also the owner he is 
consuming from his own wealth. When the manager is not also the owner he would have 
an incentive to take more from the firm than his contract entails. If the manager is not 
required to settle up for what he has taken ex post then this will be accounted for in the 
ex-ante contract, this will result in the manager consuming more on the job than he has 
already paid for it.  
 Assuming the manager’s future wages are a marketable asset and the revision of 
his wage contract ex post depends on his current performance and his fulfillment of the 
contracts, he will not take extra from the firm as this will negatively affect the value of 
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his human capital. The costs to his future wage and reputation will be affected by his 
current actions on the contract with the firm (Fama 1980). 
The manager’s wage is negotiated based on the expected value of his marginal 
product. To ensure a manager does not consume more and give less effort after the 
contract is signed a mechanism for ex post enforcement is built into the model. Future 
expected marginal products are derived from the past differences in the actual marginal 
product and what was forecasted. Thus there is an averaging effect and results in a full ex 
post settling up. This is not affected by managers switching firms.  
 The manager’s wage is dependent on the full past performance of the manager 
and the wages thus result in a full ex post settling up that cannot be avoided. His wage is 
the expected value of his future marginal product, which is based on past marginal 
product. Thus the manager’s performance directly affects his wage. His shirking in one 
period will be accounted for in the next. This ex post settling up makes the manager 
accountable for his action in this period and resolves the incentive problem. Thus owners 
of the firm need not be concerned about the agency problems as the managers will be 
compensated accordingly to their performance as measured by the labour market (Fama 
1980). 
 
2.4 Empirical Studies 
 As mentioned previously the majority of empirical papers examine American 
hospitalist models in their designated institutions. Wachter et al 2002 compiled the 
empirical papers for the five years (1996 through September 2001) following the 
program’s introduction of the program in the United States. Their goal was to gage the 
hospitalist model’s impact on American hospitals with respect to use of resources, quality 
of care, patient satisfaction, and the quality of teaching. They found 19 published studies 
reporting the clinical and financial outcomes of hospitalist models. The majority of the 
studies found a significant decrease in hospital resource use, most often measured by 
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hospital costs which had an average 13.4% decrease, and an average drop in length of 
stay of 16.6%. There were reports of improved quality as measured by decreased 
readmission and mortality rates, this would infer that quality of care is at least not 
dropping. Patient satisfaction was unaffected by the hospitalist programs since the 
surveys showed no changes to patient demeanour. The authors conjectured that those 
studies in which researchers failed to find significant results lacked proper control 
groups. Overall the authors concluded that the evidence supports hospitalist model 
improvements in hospital efficiency without reducing quality of care or patient 
satisfaction (Wachter et al 2002). The following details a few empirical studies of the 
hospitalist model, mostly analysing its effect on the economics of operating a hospital.  
The only Canadian empirical paper, (Hong et al 2010) examining the hospitalist 
program focussed solely on one common problem, infections associated with hospital 
stay, resulting from the quality of care, and ran a sensitivity analysis of the potential 
benefits of a new hospitalist program. The paper used hypothesized benefits and did not 
evaluate the effects an established hospitalist program has on the quality of care. Hong et 
al (2010) undertook a cost-benefit analysis of bloodstream infections among 
haemodialysis patients (BSI’s) in Canada, a common infection resulting from 
complications during a hospital stay, which dramatically increases the costs to the health 
care provider.  The data was retrieved from the Canadian Institute of Health Information 
database over a 6 month period and involved cases of BSI from a pool of procedures. 
Using the survey of American health institutions they hypothesized a possible 20% to 
30% reduction in BSIs through the employment of a hospitalist program. By using the 
cost of acute care hospital stays by medical condition in Canada in 2004 to 2005 to 
estimate the costs of BSI per stay and adjusting for inflation, they were able to estimate 
the current BSI treatment cost. To perform the CBA the authors took the additional costs 
to run the hospitalist program and compared them to the potential cost savings resulting 
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from a 10% to 30% reduction in BSI. The authors found a breakeven point at a 16.6% 
reduction in BSI occurrences (Hong, et al. 2010 ).  
Metlzer et al (2002) examined 6511 patients who were admitted to the general 
medicine service at the University of Chicago between 1997 and 1999. Patients were 
cared for by either one of two hospitalists or one of 52 non-hospitalist teams. Within the 
total sample, 24.8% of the patients were assigned to hospitalist teams while the remainder 
were treated by non-hospitalist teams. Between the two groups, age, sex, diagnosis mix, 
and Charlson index score (a measure of morbidity) did not significantly differ, thus the 
groups were analytically comparable. 
The results of the generalized linear models showed  average adjusted length of 
stay was 0.29 days shorter for the patients under the care of a hospitalist in the first year 
During the second year, the reduction was 0.49 days , a significant drop considering the 
number of patients seen per year.. Average adjusted costs were however not significantly 
lower for the hospitalists in year 1 but 782 USD lower in year 2. Combining years 1 and 
2 showed no difference in the 30 day mortality rates between the two groups, but when 
examining year 2 alone, the hospitalist 30 day mortality was 1.8% lower. Using 
multivariate analysis the researchers showed relative resource usage and in-hospital 
mortality decrease with physician experience in inpatient care. (Meltzer, et al. 2002). 
 Rifkin et al (2004) examined all inpatient admissions during 2001 in the 
department of medicine at a community based teaching hospital. Data was collected for 
attending records (hospitalist or non-hospitalist care provider), length of stay, and 
principle diagnosis related group (DRG), which places the patients into similar samples 
of illness or other afflictions. The authors ran a bivariate analysis on each physician 
group and a two-level hierarchical multivariate random intercept regression model with 
the patients as the first level and the physician as the second. The researchers coded the 
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output a “1” if the patient LOS was greater than the DRG adjusted standard LOS or “0” 
otherwise. They wanted to examine the impact of physician level characteristics on 
patient LOS while controlling for patient severity. The difference between a hospitalist 
and a non-hospitalist is expressed as the probability that a hospitalist was involved when 
LOS exceeded the average. 
Their main findings were that for a given principal DRG, hospitalists’ patients were 
not as likely to exceed average LOS as non-hospitalists’ patients. When controlling for 
years since physician graduation (experience), patient age, and admission volume to the 
units, the hospitalists’ patients were still less likely to have an above average LOS 
(Rifkin, et al. 2004).  
 Dynan et al (2009) used qualitative methods to develop a quantitative approach 
for hypothesis testing to examine the hospitalist knowledge of patients and practices. 
They follow past literature that suggests hospitalists have lower costs or charges for 
caring for patients when compared to traditional practices. This resulted in a shorter LOS 
and reduction in diagnostic services all the while not lowering the quality or intensity of 
care. By examining all the patients admitted to the University Hospital in Cincinnati for 
hospitalists and non-hospitalists from June 2006 to July 2007, they found evidence of 
cost savings through reduced LOS and more efficient diagnostics. Further, while some 
hospitalists vary in their diagnostic procedure (some are more efficient than others), all 
result in lower diagnostic and ancillary charges when compared to physician lead 
teaching teams. (Dynan, et al. 2009) 
 Through interviews with the director of general internal medicine and surveys of 
physicians the authors gathered details about the program to facilitate the development of 
the research. These interviews showed that hospitalists see themselves as aiming to 
provide efficient low-cost care without diminishing quality (Dynan, et al. 2009). This is 
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an important piece in discovering the motivation or social welfare function of this 
hospitalist program.  
Dynan et al (2009) analyzed the patient level data over a one year period. This data 
reported hospital administrative data, as well as the patient LOS, 15-day, and 30-day 
readmission, and hospital mortality. The authors controlled for the severity of the patient 
though the use of the 30 comorbidities index identified by Elixhauser et al (1998) which 
grades the patients severity based on a list of known conditions, afflictions, and 
alignments.  
They obtained the following results. First when controlling for patient severity the 
hospitalist program had $1713 less total charges per patient which was a statistically 
significant reduction compared to the costs incurred by non-hospitalists. Second LOS is 
significantly shorter by 1.5 days when the patient was admitted for intensive care, but not 
when admitted to general care. Third, there was no significant difference between groups 
in the 15/30 day readmission rate or in-hospital mortality rate. Finally, the authors found 
that certain hospitalists were more efficient in terms of shorter length of stay and fewer 
diagnostic tests, while others demonstrated a trade-off between the numbers of tests run 
on a patient and the amount of time they were kept in hospital. The authors conjectured 
that these results show hospitalists at different stages of expertise, where the most 
efficient are more experienced with delivering hospital care. 
 Overall Dynan et al (2009) found that hospitalists have significantly shorter LOS 
(0.395 days shorter) which turns into 9.5 hours quicker bed turnover. Hospitalists incur 
lower charges, both in total and when broken down (radiology, labs, blood banks, 
prescriptions, etcetera.). There was no significant difference in the 15/30 day 
readmissions or in-hospital mortality between the hospitalist and non-hospitalist 
physicians. Thus hospitalists are on average more efficient diagnosticians than teaching-
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team members as they incur fewer charges for tests. They also enhance hospital 
throughput by reducing LOS without diminishing quality of care. 
Gregory et al (2003) examined the effects of the hospitalist model from the point of 
view of the hospital’s economics. This impact on economics was taken in terms of length 
of stay, changes in the costs per day, patient throughput, reimbursement outcomes, the 
total costs of the hospitalist program, and the incremental profitability. This analysis was 
conducted at the Tufts-New England Medical Centre. They took three study periods of 
six consecutive weeks each. The hospitalist group was taken during August and 
September 1998, with two control groups of non-hospitalist data from the six weeks 
before and after the study period. The data obtained included the patient demographics, 
utilization, and discharge disposition which identified such variables as where the patient 
is to be discharged to, and the level of care to be received. The authors used the Medicare 
case-mix index to approximate patient severity. Additionally the patient length of stay, 
direct costs of care (which covered costs related to delivering care such as nursing, 
medication, supplies and tests), and net revenues were also recorded. To account for the 
incremental hospitalist costs the authors examined the physician salary level relative to 
their productivity, or the number of patients cared for per day. The net revenues were 
recorded as charges to third party payers minus contractual adjustment. Incremental net 
revenues were expressed as average net revenues per day (Gregory et al 2003) 
 The overall hospitalist economic effect in Gregory et al (2003) was measured as 
the incremental revenues minus costs, or the incremental contribution margin. The 
authors made several assumptions:  
(1) the arrival of patients to the unit is random,  
(2) their lengths of stay are distributed randomly,  
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(3) length of stay does not decrease with the increase of patient arrivals,  
(4) when the unit is at capacity new patients looking for care are not admitted to 
this unit and are admitted to another hospital.  
The authors found statistically significant differences in length of stay, cost per 
case, and cost per day. Hospitalist patient length of stay was 1.29 days shorter with the 
inclusion of observation days, and 1.5 days shorter without the observation days. Direct 
hospital costs were $540 lower per case for the hospitalist group. The incremental 
contribution margin of the hospitalist was around $1.44 per patient or $1,285 per year not 
counting the throughput effect of lower length of stay. (Gregory et al 2003) 
 The costs savings arise due to the reduction in LOS, even though the total 
laboratory, consulting, radiology, and medication costs did not decline. Thus there will be 
a breakeven mix of reduced LOS and increased per diem charges. This can be a major 
benefit given many hospitals are at capacity and increased throughput results in the 
increased contribution margin of this hospitalist model. Thus not only is the model 
benefiting society with the increase of patients cared for but also will increase the 
revenues to the hospital. (Gregory et al 2003) 
 Lindenauser et al 2007 conducted a retrospective study of patients over 18 years 
of age who were admitted and cared for from September 2002 to June 2005 to 45 
hospitals throughout the US. The severity of the patients was controlled by limiting the 
sample to patients that suffered from a defined list of conditions. Multivariate analysis 
was used to compare the quality and outcomes of care provided by the sampled 
physicians. In total there were 284 hospitalists, 993 general internists, and 971 family 
physicians. The results showed that patients cared for by hospitalists had a shorter length 
of stay (0.4 days shorter; P value<0.001) and lower costs (268 USD lower; P value=0.02) 
and similar inpatient mortality rates and 14-day readmission rates when compared to the 
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general internists. When compared to the family physicians the hospitalists again had 
shorter LOS (0.4 days shorter; P value<0.001), insignificant difference in costs (125 USD 
lower; P value=0.33), and similar mortality and readmission rates. Thus the hospitalists 
were slightly more efficient and less costly without reducing the quality of care, as 
measured by the 14-day readmission and inpatient mortality rates, when compared to 
general internists, yet when compared to family physicians the hospitalists had only 
minor differences. 
 Not all papers were able to find statistical improvements associated with a 
hospitalist program. Tingle et al (2001) measured the direct costs, laboratory charges, 
radiology charges, total charges, LOS, and mortality of two inpatient teams (residence 
faculty and the hospitalist unit) that work in parallel. They do not share patients or 
consult each other. The residence team consisted of 1
st
, 2
nd
, and 3
rd
 year residents and 
attending family physician faculty members. The hospitalist group was comprised of 5 
general internists that have no teaching responsibilities. Both teams provided care within 
an intensive care unit, coronary care unit, general adult ward, and observation unit 
(Tingle et al 2001). 
 The authors examined the patients admitted to both units from April 1998 to June 
1999. They used ANOVA to analyze and compare the variances, while adjusting for 
differences in the severity of patients. Chi-squared tests were used to assess the 
differences in gender distribution and to compare mortality rates. Student t tests were 
employed to detect demographic and severity differences. Outliers of charges, costs, and 
LOS were truncated at 3 standard deviations above the mean, and a retrospective power 
test analysis was performed to determine the number of cases needed to detect a $1000 
difference in total charges and 0.5 days reduction in LOS. The results of the paper 
showed mean total lab and radiology charges were slightly lower for the hospitalist group 
but were not significantly different, and mean LOS and direct costs were however higher 
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for the hospitalist group yet not significant after adjusting for severity. Thus overall the 
authors were unable to detect any statistically significant difference between the two 
groups (Tingle and Lambert 2001). 
Brownell et al 1995, proved in their study of eight Manitoba hospitals during the 
fiscal years 1989-90, 1990-91, and 1991-92 that Canadian hospitals do have statistically 
significant variation in patient length of stay. Even when adjusting for severity and social 
characteristics they showed that approximately 189 beds between the eight hospitals 
(ranging from 0 to 40 in each) could have been saved if all the hospitals were run as 
efficiently as the top hospital. The authors controlled for patient severity and affliction by 
grouping them into homogenous diagnostic and surgical groups through the use of the 
Refined Diagnosis Related Group (RDRG) software. This software categorizes and 
subdivides patients into diagnostic or surgical groups (Brownell and Roos, 1995). 
Along with age and sex the analysis controlled for socioeconomic characteristics. 
Since hospitals serve patients from several areas and because poorer patients require 
longer hospital stays, the authors added three variables. Patients were grouped into 
quintiles of neighbourhoods ranging from poorest to wealthiest income levels as derived 
from the 1986 Canadian census. Patients were classified as being residents of the core 
area (inner city) of Winnipeg, since this area was known for low-income housing, high 
rates of poverty, single parent families, and high unemployment. The authors also 
considered finally whether the patient had treaty status, since “native people are the most 
disadvantaged in Canadian society and are disproportionately likely to be treated in the 
three hospitals serving the core area of Winnipeg”(Brownell et al, 1995, pg. 676).  
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By employing multi linear regression analysis the authors produced several 
models, first by separating the RDRGs then combining them to establish the LOS for all 
eight individual hospitals. Assuming the hospital with the lowest LOS to be the most 
efficient the authors examined the expected LOS of the other seven hospitals with their 
actual LOS. The results showed that even when controlling for severity and 
socioeconomic characteristics of patients certain hospitals still had significantly higher 
LOS when compared to the most efficient hospital and to the group average. Moreover, 
the authors compared these results to American average LOS and concluded that these 
eight Manitoba hospitals could further increase efficiency if US standards were adopted 
(Brownell et al, 1995). This paper supports the theory that Canadian hospitalist models 
can be measured by their effects on hospital efficiency (as in American papers) despite 
differences in health systems and motivations behind the initiation of the hospitalist 
program. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
Hypotheses 
The existing literature indicates the hospitalist model’s effects on other North 
American hospitals (Dynan et al 2009, Gregory et al 2007, Lindenauser et al 2007, 
Gregory et al 2003, and Wachter et al 2002). Interpreting these results leads to the 
following hypothesis about the hospitalist program operating in the SHR. First it has been 
documented in the United States that the operation and employment of hospitalist 
physicians has most often lead to the reduction in average patient LOS when compared to 
non-hospitalist general practitioners. Brownell et al (1995) have shown that reductions in 
patient LOS are possible through process improvements in the Canadian context. This 
leads to our first hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 1: The Hospitalist program has reduced patient Length of Stay. 
Business process re-engineering does not always bear the intended outcomes 
immediately. Often there is a time lag between initiation of the new program/ system and 
its true results. This can be caused by several factors including the development of new 
skills, application of existing skills in new areas, political and operational resistance, or a 
failure to accept the new paradigm by employees and/or managers (Asif et al 2009, 
Attaran 2000, Stoddard et al 1996). Kuo et al (2010) identified that the average patient 
LOS decreases over time. The authors attributed this to the new hospitalists adjusting to 
their new environment and roles while honing their skills with caring of inpatients. This 
same adjustment and improvement over time can be expected in the SHR and is captured 
by our second hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 2: The LOS relating to Hospitalist patients will decrease with time. 
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Before July 2010 the hospitalists were paid a fixed stipend and the Health Region 
billed and collected funds from the government for the fee of service delivered by the 
hospitalist. This directly reduced the cost of funding the program. After July 2010 the 
hospitalist fixed stipend was reduced substantially but the physician now bills and 
collects the fee-for-service. This variable pay is directly linked to the services provided 
and the length of stay of the patient. The per-day fee decreases as length of stay increases. 
This creates an incentive for hospitalists to reduce length of stay to increase patient 
throughput and increase income. This hypothesis stems from Ellis et al (1986) where they 
examined physician actions under various types of provider reimbursements. Under the 
retrospective system, known in Canada as the fee-for-service system, physicians provide 
too many services as the additional services generate extra revenues. This profit 
maximising behaviour would also explain a reduction in length of stay if it corresponded 
to the possibility of higher revenue.     
The actions of the physician can be explained by Fama (1980). The hospitalist 
(agent) is entrusted with a level of control over the delivery of care to patients 
(fulfillment of contracts), on behalf of the Health Region (principal). There is a degree of 
separation between ownership and control since the hospitalist does not operate his/her 
own private practice. The hospitalist would then be motivated to maximise profits by 
increasing services provided and patient throughput. But this behaviour is also governed 
and limited by internal and external controls. Physicians are monitored and reviewed by 
both peers and supervisors, and the need to maintain a professional reputation is 
important. Thus any excess profits taken in this period, such as increasing patient 
throughput by prematurely discharging them, will negatively affect future earnings. This 
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is caused by the poor practices negatively affecting the readmission rate and/or other 
quality measures such as patient satisfaction, and the physicians’ professional reputation 
would be harmed. This blow to the physicians’ reputation can have future implications on 
their pay and advancement, and will dissuade them from completely maximising 
revenues to the point of reducing the quality of care.  
McGuire (2000) and McGuire et al (1991) identify that there exists a high level of 
information asymmetry within the health care service industry.  The high degree of 
complexity inherent in medical services and the relative inexperience of patients with 
most medical procedures create this high level of information asymmetry. The patient is 
unsure of the expected outcome of the procedure and must rely on the advice of the 
physician. Physician induced demand is created when the physician is able to influence 
the level and quantity of health services provided above what is necessary. 
Hypothesis 3: Length of Stay has been reduced due to the change in Hospitalist 
payment structure.  
Reduction in length of stay and/or resource usage is only one aspect of the 
hospitalist outcomes. Quality must also be measured to ensure patient health is not 
adversely affected by a change in efficiency. Although the quality of health care can be 
measured with many different factors, previous literature uses the readmission and 
mortality rates since the data is readily available. If the program can be shown to decrease 
or maintain the readmission and mortality rates, it can be concluded that the program 
improves or maintains the quality of care provided. Results from the literature have 
shown that although the hospitalist programs have not consistently reduced the 
readmission and mortality rates, they have not increased them. Thus the program has not 
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adversely affected the quality of care provided. Our fourth and fifth hypotheses examine 
the program’s effect on the quality of care.  
Hypothesis 4: Hospitalist inpatient readmission rates will decrease. 
Hypothesis 5: Hospitalist inpatient mortality rates will decrease. 
 
These hypotheses will be tested using multivariate regression analysis of the dependent 
variables Length of Stay, readmissions, and raw mortality rate.  
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CHAPTER 4:  
4.1 Methodology 
In order to conduct an analysis of the hospitalist programs in the Saskatoon 
Health Region, Strategic Health Information and Planning Services (SHIPS) has 
extracted the data and provided retrospective de-identified patient level data from           
St. Paul’s (and Saskatoon City Hospital as the Intensive Care Unit (ICU), Primary Care 
Units (PCU), and the Medicine Units were consolidated to St. Paul's from October 2008 
to January 2009), reporting the data such as length of stay, Resource Intensity Weight 
(resource usage), readmissions, raw in hospital mortality, Case Mix Groups (patient 
diagnosis), patient characteristics (age and  sex), and patient demographics, including 
income, socio-economic status, as derived from the Stats Canada 2006 survey and the 
patient postal code of residence. Table 1 lists and describes all variables used. The time 
period covers January 1 2007 to November 30 2010 for the fiscal years April through 
March. The health region analysts extracted data from are St. Paul’s Hospital, Saskatoon 
City Hospital, and Royal University Hospital (readmission data only). The Biomedical 
Research Ethics Board (Bio-REB) at the University of Saskatchewan granted ethics 
approval (Bio #10-216). 
The dependent variables include inpatient length of stay of the initial admission 
and subsequent readmissions following discharge where the reason for readmission is 
related to the previous admission. These readmissions are chosen by identifying the 
diagnosis code and ensuring they are related to the original ailment. Any readmissions 
not directly related to the initial admission would be assumed to be a missed diagnosis 
that otherwise would have been addressed and subsequent care would be referred to other 
specialized care facilities.  In addition to the readmission rate, the in-hospital raw 
mortality rate is recorded, and other discharge codes are provided such as transfer to 
other care facilities or special care units and discharges home.  
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The independent or test variables are the funding spent on the hospitalist program 
through the Saskatoon Health Region. The funding was provided on an annual aggregate 
level. These figures were adapted for our research by dividing the annual funding by the 
annual total length of stay of all the patients in our sample. This provided a cost per LOS 
day of the hospitalist program for each fiscal year. In addition, we include dummy 
variables that identify admissions before and after the Health Region began funding the 
hospitalist program (April 1 2008) as well as, the actual date of admission. We also 
include another dummy variable to identify the admissions before and after the change in 
hospitalist pay from fixed to fixed plus variable (July 1 2010).  
Several control variables will be employed in the models which include patient 
characteristics such as age in years of each patient and gender. Severity is controlled for 
by the inclusion of the Resource Intensity Weight (RIW). The RIW variable is a measure 
of the relative amount of hospital resources used to treat a diagnosis given patient 
characteristics and length of stay. Higher RIW scores indicate cases that require higher 
levels of hospital care and thus higher patient severity.  RIW scores are calibrated 
annually so that the average inpatient acute care case in Canada has a value of one. 
Actual patient RIW will not be used in models involving our measure of LOS since LOS 
is already used to calculate this measure of RIW. In its place we use estimated Resource 
Intensity Weight (ERIW) calculated using the Canadian Institute for Health Information 
(CIHI) patient cost estimator index and actual patient age, gender, and diagnosis. This 
new measure of estimated resource usage will serve as our proxy for patient severity 
without our dependent variable directly affecting its calculation. Patient socioeconomic 
demographics will be identified through linking their postal code residency to the Stats 
Canada 2006 census tracks. To develop measures of income, education, and lineage for 
each patient, we consider each neighbourhood’s average income for residents over 16 
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years of age, the percentage of residents with a post-secondary education, and the 
percentage of residents with aboriginal heritage. 
Patient Case Mix Group (CMG) is a variable designed and used by the Health 
region to aggregate acute care for patients with similar clinical and resource-utilization 
characteristics. This diagnostic tool is also used by CIHI to develop the average length of 
stay of a given patient’s age and gender throughout Canada (CIHI 2010). This national 
expected LOS is deducted from each patients actual LOS given their age, gender, and 
CMG in our sample. This new measure is used as an additional independent variable to 
test the hospitalist program’s effects on patient LOS above or below what would be 
expected nationally.  
The most responsible physician is provided, that identifies which hospitalist was 
ultimately responsible for delivering care to the particular patient. With this information 
we are able to identify any differences in length of stay through physician techniques. 
Regression analysis is conducted using two primary models and four relating sub-
sample models. These ordinary least squares and binary logistic regression models will 
take the form: 
 Ln(LOSi )= α + ∑βiTESTi + ∑βiCONTROLSi + εi    
 LOGIT(Pi )= α + ∑βiTESTi + ∑βiCONTROLSi    
The Y variables of the models correspond to the three dependent variables LOS 
(patient length of stay of initial admission), MORT (the raw in hospital mortality rate), 
and READ_LOS (the 30 day readmission rate). The TESTi along with its coefficient βi, 
represents four test statistics: HEXP (level of funding spent of the hospitalist program), 
HOSP (hospitalist dummy variable), ADMIT_DATE (date of admission), and 
POSTCHG (post change in hospitalist payment structure), for each patient i at time t. 
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CONTROLSi represents the multiple control variables in the model along with their 
related coefficients βi. Models examining patient LOS will be specified using ordinary 
least squares regression and models exploring the readmission and mortality rates will 
utilize binary logistic regression. Due to the nature of health care data, our measure of 
patient LOS is not normally distributed so it has been transformed using natural 
logarithms. Variables relating to in-hospital mortality and the readmission rates are coded 
as 0 and 1 given the outcome of the event. Therefore binary models such as logistic or 
probit must be employed to analyze the hospitalist programs’ effect on the probability of 
the event occurring.  
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the dependent, independent, and 
control variables. Taking the sample from January 1 2007 to November 30 2010 produces 
a total of 12,667 observations. The total LOS of the initial admission of each patient 
ranges from 1 to 147 days with a mean of 10.16 and skewness of 3.9824. This positive 
skewness and non-negative range indicates this is count data, and needs to be transformed 
for our OLS model to apply. The readmission data indicates a large number of 
observations with a value of zero which may be better modeled using a binomial logistic 
regression. The patient characteristics data shows the average patient age is 68, and the 
data is distributed evenly between males and females.  
 CIHI provides analysis on the health care industry at the provincial and national 
levels, creating their measures and indexes by excluding atypical cases where actual LOS 
exceeds predetermined trim points. This explains why the average expected LOS (ELOS) 
is notably smaller than the actual average length of stay by nearly 5 days, 5.52 compared 
to 10.16 respectively. To account for this we have split our data base into subsamples. 
The subsamples include the observations where patient LOS is less than or equal to the 
Expected Length of Stay (ELOS) measure provided by CIHI given the patient 
characteristics and diagnosis. The other sub sample contains the observations whose 
patients LOS exceeds the ELOS. The robustness of these results will be tested by 
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repeating the analysis with subsamples above and below ELOS plus one and two 
standard deviations. The creation of the typical and atypical groups addresses the issue of 
identifying and classifying high-LOS observations as outliers. The high-LOS 
observations do not fall under the true definition of outliers since they are not errors in 
the sample, but do differ from those observations with smaller LOS. Table 2.2 and 2.3 
present the descriptive statistics for the two subsamples.  
 Table 3 presents the Pearson Correlation Matrix for our sample. The data is 
interrelated as expected. Average income is positively related to education (0.77) and age 
(0.20). Age is negatively related to being discharged home (-0.32) and positively related 
to being discharged to another care facility/ unit (0.24). Age confirmed to be a large 
determinant of LOS, with a positive correlation of 0.33. RIW has the highest correlation 
with actual LOS (0.79).This is due to LOS being an input in the calculation of RIW. Due 
to this fact, RIW will not be used in any regression involving LOS as the dependent 
variable.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Results of Regressions 
5.1 Hypothesis 1: The Hospitalist Program has reduced patient Length of Stay. 
 To test whether the hospitalist program has improved hospital efficiency through 
a reduction in patient length of stay we develop the following model specification for 
both the below and above ELOS sub samples. Since actual LOS is made of non-negative 
integer values, we will be taking the natural logarithm of the dependent variable (LOS) to 
determine the appropriate relationship.  
 Ln(LOSi )= α + ∑βiTESTi + ∑βiCONTROLSi + εi  
 Tables 4.1 through 4.6 present the regression results for the atypical (LOS above 
ELOS + 0, 1, and 2 Standard Deviation) and typical (LOS below ELOS + 0, 1, and 2 
Standard Deviation) subgroups respectively. The test statistic HEXP, the annual dollar of 
funding per LOS day, has a statistically insignificant coefficient in all of the sub groups 
containing observations with LOS below ELOS, indicating that additional funding spent 
on the hospitalist program does not improve delivery of care efficiency for patients with 
lower LOS. This result is further supported by the regression using the dummy variable 
HOSP to indicate admissions during the hospitalist program. The coefficient of the 
variable HOSP is not statistically significant and has no effect on patients’ LOS being 
shorter or longer than non-hospitalist admissions in any of our three subgroups below 
ELOS.  
Examining Tables 4.1 through 4.3 Columns 2 and 3, for the regressions with the 
atypical subgroup, the test variables HEXP and HOSP both have statistically significant 
positive coefficients at 1% level of confidence, 0.00156 and 0.0628 respectively in our 
sub-sample of LOS above ELOS plus zero standard deviations. The coefficients are again 
significant, 0.00103 (HEXP), and 0.03906 (HOSP), at the 5% level of significance in our 
sub-sample of LOS above ELOS plus 1 standard deviation, and neither variable is 
significant in our final subsample, LOS above ELOS plus 2 standard deviations. 
Interpreting these results implies that as we increase the funding spent per LOS day by 
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one dollar, the expected LOS will increase between 0.156% to 0.103% in the groups with 
ELOS plus 0 and +1 standard deviations, and the inpatient admissions during the 
hospitalist program had expected LOS that were 6.28% to 3.906% higher than our non-
hospitalist group. These results are contrary to our hypothesis 1 and other empirical 
papers where funding spent by the Saskatoon Health Region on the hospitalist program 
has not improved hospital efficiency by reducing inpatient LOS. The hospitalist program 
had no statistically significant effect on LOS for patients with low LOS, and effectively 
increased expected LOS for atypical cases.  
 Examining the other control variables of patient characteristics and socio 
economic residency, we see results that confirm our initial intuitions about factors that 
affect LOS. Patient age is positively associated with the actual LOS for both the typical 
and atypical admissions; education (as measured by the percentage of population with 
post-secondary education in the neighbourhood of patient residency) is both positively 
associated with the actual LOS for the admissions above and below ELOS plus 0 
standard deviations. However, gender and being from a neighbourhood with a higher 
percentage of residents from aboriginal decent does not affect patient LOS.  
 Variables were included for the nine hospitalists (labelled A though I to maintain 
their anonymity) whose average patient LOS was statistically different from the other 30 
physicians. These nine were identified by executing the student-t test and comparing the 
average LOS of the patients care for by each hospitalist respectively, to the average 
patient LOS of the entire sample. Using dummy variables we see that patients cared for 
by 3 of the hospitalist A and B had significantly higher LOS for patients with typical 
LOS, and only hospitalist C had significantly lower patient LOS for admissions with 
typical LOS. Patients with atypical LOS cared for by these hospitalists were not shown to 
have statistically different LOS amongst the various physicians. This implies there was 
no distinct difference in physician practice when caring for inpatients with atypically long 
hospital stay. There is however evidence that shows significant differences in patient 
LOS amongst physicians in the typical subgroups. These differences may be the result of 
physicians being more experienced in delivering care, and/or different physician 
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preferences and practices relating to patient discharge. More research will be needed to 
determine the cause of these findings.  
  
5.2 Hypothesis 2: Patient LOS decreases with time. 
 To test the change in LOS over time we replace the test variable in the above OLS 
model with the date of admission. Tables 4.1 to 4.6 Column 4, show quadratic 
relationships between the dates of admission and actual patient LOS for our atypical 
subsamples and typical subsample below ELOS +2 standard deviations. Patient LOS is 
shown to slightly rise then fall as the hospitalist program progresses through these 
subsamples. To aid in the analysis we create a subsample of the final year of the 
observations in order to estimate the increase or decrease in LOS over the following year. 
Table 5.1 presents the OLS model for the most recent dates of admission. Due to 
insignificance the quadratic term is removed. This model shows a negative linear 
relationship between the date of admission and the average patient LOS. As admission 
date increases by one additional day, the actual inpatient LOS decreases by 0.046% per 
day or 15.59% per year. Extending this decrease from the most recent average LOS of 
9.63 days, average patient LOS will decrease by 1.5 days. We can expect the relationship 
to change from linear to quadratic as the physicians become their most efficient and the 
marginal reduction in LOS decreases. Thus, we anticipate that the average LOS would 
level off at some point in the future.  
 Table 2.4, provides the average LOS for each fiscal year in our sample. Average 
LOS is shown to increase from 8.84 days in the 2006-07 fiscal year, to 10.33 and 11.67 
days in the fiscal years 2007-08 and 2008-09 respectively. Subsequently the average LOS 
declines to 10.06 days in the fiscal period 2009-10 and 9.48 days in the final period 2010-
11. To test if this change in LOS over time can be attributed to the hospitalist program, 
we add a new variable HOPS_Admit_date, which is the product of the date of admission 
and the hospitalist dummy variable, and run the regression model on each sample. 
Additionally we applied the hospitalist dummy variable to the control variables to test if 
the patient characteristics differ between hospitalist and non-hospitalist observations. 
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Tables 5.2 presents the results of the regression identifying the effects the hospitalist 
program has on the reduction in patient LOS over time. The quadratic variable 
Admit_Date^2 is removed due to it insignificance. The results show a negative linear 
relationship between the date of admission and patient LOS with a statistically significant 
coefficient at the 1% level for the entire sample. However the hospitalist date variable has 
a statistically positive coefficient at the 1% level. The sample has an admission date 
coefficient of   -0.00016, interpreting that for each day, LOS is expected to decrease by 
0.016%. The coefficient for the admission date variable for the hospitalist observations is 
0.000007, interpreting that patient LOS decrease by 0.0153% per day during the 
hospitalist program. These results show that the hospitalist program cannot be attributed 
to the decreasing patient LOS over time. Conversely our results show that during the 
hospitalist program, patient LOS decreases less over time than our non-hospitalist 
sample. The decrease in patient LOS in both samples would be the result from some other 
time- dependent factor such as physician experience and professional development.  
 
5.3 Hypothesis 3: The change in payment structure will reduce LOS.  
 We further subdivided the data into two samples corresponding to the five months 
before and after the change in hospitalist payment structure. Before July 2010 the 
hospitalists were paid a fixed stipend and the Health Region billed and collected funds 
from the Government for the fee-for-service delivered by the hospitalist. This directly 
reduced the cost of funding the program as the fixed cost of the hospitalists’ pay was 
being offset by the collections of the variable fee-for-service payments. After July 2010 
the hospitalist fixed stipend was reduced substantially and the hospitalist in turn billed 
and collected for the fee-for-service directly. This variable pay is directly linked to the 
services provided and the length of stay of the patient. The per-day fee decreases as 
length of stay increases. This creates an incentive for hospitalists to reduce length of stay 
to increase patient throughput and increase income.    
 This sub division produced 1365 observations after the change in payment 
structure (July 1 2010 to November 30 2010) with an average LOS of 9.2 days and 1379 
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observations before the change with a mean LOS of 10.06 days. These means are 
statistically different from each other at the 1% significance level. Examining the data, 
there does not appear to be a significant amount of discharges around LOS days 30 to 32. 
The rate of discharge continues to decline by the same rate over this period. Following 
the approach of dividing our sample between typical and atypical cases provides similar 
results. The change in payment structure is shown to reduce patient LOS by 6.77% 
(statistically significant at the 10% level) in the below ELOS plus 0 standard deviations 
sample, 5.49% (statistically significant at the 10% level) below ELOS plus 1 standard 
deviation, and 6.07% (statistically significant at the 10% level) below ELOS plus 2 
standard deviations, as per Tables 4.4 to 4.6 Columns 5. The variable representing the 
change in payment structure does not have a statistically significant coefficient in any of 
the three atypical LOS samples above ELOS. 
 The OLS regressions testing the effect of the payment structure change on the 
difference between actual and expected LOS are presented in Table 4.1 to 4.6 Columns 5. 
By multiplying the before payment change average LOS in each typical subgroup by the 
respective coefficients of the regression models, we are able to quantify the change in 
LOS days. The results show for the typical admissions subgroup below 0 standard 
deviations, that by changing the hospitalist compensation from fixed to variable the 
average LOS decreased by 0.30 days, or 7 hours and 14 minutes, to just over 4.6 days. 
Below ELOS plus 1 standard deviation subgroup, the average LOS decreased by 0.23 
days. Over 2 standard deviations subgroup, the average LOS decreased by 0.23 days. For 
the atypical admission subgroup there is no statistical evidence to suggest that the change 
in payment structure affects the efficiency.  Although this is not a large figure, this has 
the effect of increasing hospital throughput by an estimated 36 to 129 admissions per year 
for typical observations, given the average annual admissions in our samples. This 
decrease in the average LOS supports our hypothesis that the change from fixed to 
variable compensation has indeed provided an incentive to increase efficiency by 
reducing patient LOS. 
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5.4 Hypothesis 4: Hospitalist inpatient readmission rates will decrease. 
 To test the quality of care, the readmissions of patients for procedures relating to 
the initial admission is examined to determine if reduced LOS of the initial admission has 
reduced the effectiveness of the services, thereby resulting in the patient having to be 
readmitted subsequently for the same affliction, or other ailments that should have been 
diagnosed during the original examination. A reduction in the readmission rate may 
indicate an improvement in the quality of care provided. To test the effect of the 
hospitalist program on the readmission rate we code each readmission as 1 if the patient 
was readmitted for reasons relating to the previous admission and 0 otherwise. We then 
employ binary logistic regression on our four test variables, hospitalist funding per day 
LOS, hospitalist dummy variable, date of admission, and post change in hospitalist 
compensation dummy variable. We include all previous control variables and physician 
dummy variables in the binary logistic models.  
 Table 6 presents the results of the binary logistic regressions and the impact of 
hospitalist funding on readmission. As the variable HEXP has a negative coefficient       
(-0.0022) that is not statistically significant, no conclusions can be made on the effects of 
hospitalist funding on readmissions. This does not support the hypothesis that quality of 
care provided is being improved due to the funding of the hospitalist program, but it does 
not disprove it completely due to the statistical insignificance. Examination of the control 
variables shows that none have statistically significant coefficients. The physician 
dummy variables indicated two out of the six hospitalists we included with statistically 
different patient LOS also had significant positive effects on patient readmission. The 
percentage of patients being readmitted for relating treatments following discharge is 
expected to be 30.26% and 12.28% higher for patients cared for by hospitalists C and F 
respectively at a 1% and 5% level of significance. This indicated patient readmissions are 
related to qualitative physician specific factors. Due to personal experience and 
professional judgement, different physicians do have different readmission rates.  
 The binary logistic regression model tests the hospitalist program dummy 
variable, HOSP, on the readmission rate. As before the test variable has a negative 
coefficient (-0.0875) which is not statistically significant. As this is not significantly 
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different from zero, this does not support our hypothesis that the program has improved 
quality and/or effectiveness of care provided. We also note that the control and dummy 
variables all have similar signs, magnitude, and statistically significance, including the 
statistical significance of hospitalists C and F. 
 We further test the effects of the date of admission and the change in hospitalist 
compensation on the readmission rate. These regressions add greater depths to our results 
given these factors were shown to affect patient LOS. Both the coefficients for variables 
ADMIT_DATE and POSTCHG are not statistically significant and thus have no effect on 
the rate of readmission of patients following discharge. Although the expected LOS has 
decreased as the program continued and subsequently due to the change in payment 
structure, the quality and effectiveness of care has not decreased as measured by patient 
readmissions.  
5.5 Hypothesis 5: Hospitalist inpatient mortality rate will decrease. 
 In addition to the readmission rate we also include the raw mortality rate of 
inpatients cared for by the hospitalist program to measure effectiveness and quality of 
care provided. The raw mortality rate is measured by creating the dummy variable 
MORT, were 1 indicated the patient died while in care of a hospitalist or 0 otherwise. We 
used a binary logistic regression to test the effect of the hospitalist program, hospitalist 
funding, admission date, and change in payment structure on the raw mortality rate. 
Additionally we included the control variables for illness severity, characteristics, and 
socio economic residency and the physician dummy variables for our six hospitalists with 
statistically different patient length of stay. The results are presented in Table 7. 
 The four test variables HEXP, HOSP, ADMIT_DATE, and POSTCHG do not 
have statistically significant coefficients. This does not support our hypothesis that the 
quality and effectiveness of care as measured by the raw mortality rate has been 
improved by the introduction, and funding of the hospitalist program. Although the time 
factors (in other words, admission date) and post change in hospitalist payment both have 
reduced patient length of stay, neither factors have any effect on in-patient raw mortality. 
This shows that quality of care is not affected by increased efficiency. The only control 
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variables that were shown to have any effect on the raw mortality rate are patient age, 
gender, and the Resource Intensity Weight rating as determined by the patient diagnosis. 
In agreement with Evans and Stoddart (1990) and Acton (1975), age and gender, where 
males have a shorter life expectancy, are shown to positively affect the probability of 
mortality as both have statistically significant coefficients at the 1% level. Resource 
Intensity Weight, our measure of illness severity is shown to be positively related to the 
raw mortality rate of patients cared for by hospitalists with a coefficient that has a 1% 
level of statistical significance.   
5.6 Economic Effects of the Hospitalist Model 
 Using the coefficients from our regression models, we produce a modified cost 
benefit analysis. A traditional approach to CBA would be inappropriate given the nature 
of the hospitalist project in the SHR. This hospitalist program did not have a large upfront 
cost, alternatively all the costs and benefits are incurred in the same period thus 
suggesting that, there is no need to discount future periods to calculate the net benefit. 
Further, the hospitalist program was not established to directly decrease costs. So a CBA 
examining only the monetary costs and benefits would not address other quantitative 
benefits such as patient throughput. The costs and benefits are quantified using 
information received through direct interviews with SHR employees and reports 
produced by SHR.  
 Tables 8.1 through 8.12 present our economic analysis of the hospitalist program 
based on changes in patient LOS. The analysis represents one hospitalist physician 
providing services for 1 year comprised of 48 weeks. The hospitalist is expected to care 
for 20 to 25 patients at a time, and is responsible of all services and care provided to 
them. The direct cost of the hospitalist program is represented by the fixed stipend paid to 
each hospitalist equalling $6,500.00 per week of service or $312,000.00 per year. The 
direct benefits are represented by the reduction in LOS and resulting increase in patient 
throughput. The SHR fee-for-service payment schedule is used to quantify one day LOS 
and patient discharge. Currently all hospitalist and non-hospitalist General Practitioners 
receiving fee-for-service compensation receive a fee for each inpatient they are 
responsible for based on the scale $30.20 per day for the first 30 days and $23.80 per day 
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thereafter for patients cared for under General Practice, plus an additional $12.10 per 
discharge. 
 Since there is a high demand for open beds in the Province of Saskatchewan, it is 
assumed the hospitalist will always operate with the maximum amount of patients under 
the set limits (20 to 25). The benefits are calculated as per the following formula: 
(                                    )  (                    )
 ∑(                       ) 
 Table 8.1 shows the current average LOS (9.63 days) over the last year of the 
data, November 2009 to November 2010. The analysis assumes the hospitalist will care 
for 20 to 25 patients at a time, and has a fixed 336 days to bill FFS (48 weeks * 7 days). 
Given the average LOS the total number of patients that can be cared for in the year 
ranges from 697 to 872 per hospitalist, and the total FFS earned ranges from $211,171.31 
to $264,191.37.  
 The coefficient for the date of admission from the regression model of the natural 
log of patient LOS shows there is a significant negative relationship between the date of 
admission and the average LOS. Average LOS is expected to decrease by 0.04643% or 
15.59% over the following year. Give the Regina Qu’Appelle Health region established 
their program with the expectation of decreasing LOS by 17%, this forecast is reasonable.  
 Table 8.2 presents the effects on patient throughput and change in benefits due to 
the expected decrease in average LOS by 15.59%. The additional patients that can be 
seen during the year range from 129 to 161. This increase in patient throughput translates 
into direct benefits of $39,083.36 to $48,778.45 per year if the average LOS does not 
reduce further. Unfortunately these benefits cannot be attributed solely to the hospitalist 
program since our analysis shows the decrease in patient LOS occurred in both the 
hospitalist and non-hospitalist samples. 
 We conduct a similar analysis quantifying the effects the change in payment 
structure on the SHR. Following the process outlined above, Tables 8.3 to 8.8 presents 
the analysis of the hospitalist program before and after the change in payment structure 
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for our typical subgroups 0, +1, and +2 standard deviations below the average day LOS. 
Table 8.4 shows that the change in payment structure, from the fixed stipend to the 
smaller stipend plus the fee-for-service subsidies, has reduced average LOS by 6.07% in 
the subgroup below 0 standard deviations, as reported in Table 4.4 Column 5. This lower 
LOS has resulted in an increased patient throughput of 36 to 44 in our model year, or a 
direct benefit of $5,840.06 to $7,137.85. The typical subgroup below +1 standard 
deviation had a 5.49% decrease in average LOS, resulting in an increase of 55 to 69 more 
patients being cared for and a direct benefit of $7,670.15 to $9,622.55. The typical 
subgroup below +2 standard deviations showed a 6.77% decrease in average LOS, 
resulting in an increase in hospital throughput of 103 to 129 additional patients, and a 
direct benefit of $11,754.40 to $14,721.43. Due to the insignificant regression results in 
the atypical subsamples, this analysis cannot be applied to patients with LOS above our 
established trim points.   
Extending our analysis further we quantify the effects of the introduction of the 
hospitalist program on patient throughput in Tables 8.9 through 8.12. The atypical 
subgroups over 0 and 1 standard deviation are the only significant coefficients from our 
OLS models examining the relationship between patient LOS and the dummy variable 
identifying the hospitalist program. Thus these will be the only groups that can be tested 
using our analysis. This average atypical patient LOS for the hospitalist program over 0 
standard deviations is 6.28% higher than the non-hospitalists observations, from Table 
4.1 Column 2. This increase in LOS has resulted in a decrease of 15 to 19 patients cared 
for in our given physician year or a cost of $319,003.36.36 to $320,870.93 including the 
paid stipend. The atypical subgroup above +1 standard deviation showed the average 
patient LOS increased by 3.91% following the introduction of the hospitalist program, as 
per Table 4.2 Column 2. This would cause 5 to 6 fewer patients to be admitted in our year 
for a cost of 315,037.83 to $315,645.39 per hospitalist per year as per our above analysis.  
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CHAPTER 6  
 Conclusion 
The implementation of the hospitalist program, whereby physicians do not maintain an 
outpatient practice, and primarily treat in-patients, has been documented to increase 
efficiency without reducing quality of care in several hospitals across the United States. 
This thesis studies the hospitalist program and its effects on efficiency and effectiveness 
as initiated by the Saskatoon Health Region. We have expanded the body of research by 
extending economic health care research and agency theory in the Canadian health care 
context. Results of multivariate regression models show that the hospitalist program 
initially had negative effects on the efficiency of the delivery of care in regards to 
increased patient length of stay for admissions with atypically long hospital stays and no 
significant effect on short stay admissions. The hospitalist program has demonstrated no 
effect on the quality and effectiveness of care as measured by patient readmissions and in 
hospital raw mortality rates. This was documented through the statistical insignificance of 
the results.  
 The models do however show evidence of increased physician efficiency over 
time as the physicians become more skilled and adept at diagnosing and treating patients, 
familiarize themselves with the hospital and its staff, and develop their level of 
professional expertise. Our analyses show that as time progresses, patient length of stay 
reduces. But there is no definitive evidence to determine whether this is a direct result of 
the hospitalist program or the experience of the individual physicians. If the reduction in 
LOS persists into the near future, average patient length of stay would decrease by 1.5 
days in one year as per our forecasted change in hospital stay over time. Given the 
average LOS of 9.6 days per patient in the final year of our sample, and the modelled 
admissions of 697 to 872 per year per hospitalist, this translates into an additional 129 to 
161 patients being admitted and cared for by a physician per year.  
 After the change in hospitalist pay from a fixed amount to a smaller stipend plus 
the variable fee-for-service charge, our models show that common patient length of stay 
below the national average significantly decreases in our final sample period. Our 
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analysis further shows that this increase in efficiency has not had a negative impact on 
quality of care as displayed in the readmission or raw mortality rates. Although the 
change from fixed to variable pay has produced a profit maximising incentive for 
hospitalists to reduce length of stay to effectively increase pay, the outcome has not been 
negative.  
 The adapted cost benefit analysis presented in this thesis shows that although the 
direct annual dollar cost exceeds direct dollar benefits and the hospitalist program is not 
shown to directly improve hospital efficiency, there are significant gains in terms of 
patient throughput at the physician level over time. These are the main findings for the 
Saskatoon Health Region regarding the effectiveness of the hospitalist program. Further 
this thesis does not take into account any qualitative effects of the hospitalist program 
such as patient satisfaction, continuity of care post discharge, or physician satisfaction 
that have been investigated by the Health Region. Saskatchewan is known to have a 
shortage of physicians and thus the ability of the Saskatoon Health Region to hire and 
keep physicians is an important goal. Physician satisfaction and preferences are important 
to attract new hires and prevent burnout. This study does not take into account physicians 
that would prefer the employment of the hospitalist program as opposed to a practice of 
caring for in/out patients, such as a family physician. Unfortunately due to confidentiality 
issues the qualitative findings of the Hospitalist Advisory Committee could not be 
included in this thesis. 
 This thesis is a tool to aid the Saskatoon Health Region in evaluating the 
hospitalist program by determining the quantitative effects it has had on the efficiency 
and quality of inpatient care delivery. Additional qualitative research will be conducted 
by the care group that was established to review the hospitalist program. Future research 
would be beneficial as data becomes available to determine if this efficiency in care 
delivery persists over time, and to extend the study on the affects financial incentives and 
individual physician practices have on the delivery of care.   
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APPENDIX: TABLES 
Table 1: Definition of Variables 
Variable   Definition 
Dependent      
LOS  The length of stay in days of each patient admission.  
 
ReAd_LOS  The length of stay in days of each patient re-admission, where the diagnosis is related to 
the initial admission.  
 
Mort  In hospital raw mortality; 1 if the patient died while hospitalized, 0 otherwise. 
   
Control and 
Independent 
  
Hexp  The annual dollar amount spent per day length of stay on the hospitalist program. 
Calculated as the total funding expenditure on the hospitalist program in the given fiscal 
year divided by the total patient day’s length of stay cared for by hospitalists.  
 
Hosp  Dummy variable indicating 1 for admissions under the hospitalist program and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Postchg  Dummy variable indicating 1 for admissions after the change in physician payment 
structure and 0 otherwise. 
 
Abor  The percentage of population of aboriginal descent in the patient’s neighborhood of 
residence. 
 
Educ  The percentage of population of with post-secondary education in the patient’s 
neighborhood of residence. 
 
Age  The age in years of the patient. 
 
Fem  Dummy variable indicating patient gender; 1 for females and 0 for males.  
 
RIW  Resource Intensity Weight, measures the relative amount of hospital resources expected to 
be consumed during the delivery of care given he patients characteristics and diagnosis. 
 
ERIW  Expected Resource Intensity Weight, the measure of severity, calculated using the CIHI 
patient cost estimator index and actual patient age, gender, and diagnosis.  
HA  Dummy variable indicating the hospitalist; 1 for hospitalist 3 and 0 otherwise. 
 
HB  Dummy variable indicating the hospitalist; 1 for hospitalist 8 and 0 otherwise. 
 
HC  Dummy variable indicating the hospitalist; 1 for hospitalist 11 and 0 otherwise. 
 
HD  Dummy variable indicating the hospitalist; 1 for hospitalist 19 and 0 otherwise. 
 
HE  Dummy variable indicating the hospitalist; 1 for hospitalist 21 and 0 otherwise. 
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HF  Dummy variable indicating the hospitalist; 1 for hospitalist 22 and 0 otherwise. 
 
ETLOS  Expected length of stay calculated from the Canadian Institute of Health Information 
index, for the admitted patient given characteristics and diagnosis. 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics  
This table contains summary statistics for the data in the entire sample. 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis Variance 
Dependent                  
LOS 12667 1.0000 147.0000 10.1581*** 6.0000 13.4245 3.9824 21.5850 180.2171 
ReAd_LOS 12667 0.0000 148.0000 0.6767*** 0.0000 4.7118 12.5019 216.8661 22.20064 
Died 12667 0.0000 1.0000 0.0790*** 0.0000 0.2698 3.1213 7.7437 0.072785 
          
Control and Independent         
Hexp 12666 0.0000 44.0871 22.7777*** 38.3145 19.8229 -0.6699 -1.5123 392.9491 
Hosp 12667 0.0000 1.0000 0.6646*** 1.0000 0.4722 -0.6972 -1.5142 0.2229 
Postchg 12667 0.0000 1.0000 0.1070*** 0.0000 0.3091 2.5436 4.4704 0.0955 
abor 12667 0.0032 0.5824 0.1102*** 0.0978 0.0967 2.9845 11.2692 0.00936 
educ 12667 0.2453 0.6633 0.4586*** 0.4133 0.0863 -0.0518 -0.7871 0.007454 
Age 12667 16.0000 103.0000 68.6014*** 74.0000 18.9744 -0.7782 -0.1910 360.028 
fem 12667 0.0000 1.0000 0.5191*** 1.0000 0.4997 -0.0766 -1.9944 0.249653 
RIW 12667 0.1380 58.5834 1.6135*** 0.9513 2.4116 7.9489 104.3837 5.815819 
HA 12667 0.0000 1.0000 0.0587*** 0.0000 0.2350 3.7569 12.1160 0.05522 
HB 12667 0.0000 1.0000 0.0521*** 0.0000 0.2222 4.0313 14.2535 0.049393 
HC 12667 0.0000 1.0000 0.1176*** 0.0000 0.3222 2.3740 3.6366 0.1038 
HD 12667 0.0000 1.0000 0.0691*** 0.0000 0.2536 3.3990 9.5550 0.064311 
HE 12667 0.0000 1.0000 0.0669*** 0.0000 0.2498 3.4684 10.0312 0.0624 
HF 12667 0.0000 1.0000 0.0026*** 0.0000 0.0510 19.5177 379.0012 0.0026 
ETLOS 12667 1.0000 31.4191 5.5213*** 5.0000 2.6453 1.2805 3.5332 6.9978 
Asterisks *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics  
This table contains summary statistics for the data for our Typical Sub Sample (Below Expected LOS + 0 Standard Deviations) 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis Variace 
Dependent                  
LOS 5298 1.0000 17.0000 3.3411*** 3.0000 2.0802 1.3770 2.8614 4.327106 
ReAd_LOS 5298 0.0000 85.0000 0.5610*** 0.0000 3.9303 11.5000 168.8498 15.44739 
Died 5298 0.0000 1.0000 0.0791*** 0.0000 0.2699 3.1202 7.7387 0.072846 
          
Control and Independent         
Hexp 5298 0.0000 44.0872 27.8383*** 38.3150 19.8148 -0.6758 -1.5080 392.6277 
Hosp 5298 0.0000 1.0000 0.6657*** 1.0000 0.4718 -0.7028 -1.5066 0.222578 
Postchg 5298 0.0000 1.0000 0.1068*** 0.0000 0.3089 2.5463 4.4854 0.095438 
abor 5298 0.0032 0.5824 0.1082*** 0.0978 0.0927 2.9975 11.9135 0.008599 
educ 5298 0.2453 0.6633 0.4569*** 0.4133 0.0861 0.0008 -0.7791 0.007406 
Age 5298 16.0000 103.0000 67.7554*** 73.0000 19.8498 -0.7286 -0.3904 394.0153 
fem 5298 0.0000 1.0000 0.4977*** 0.0000 0.5000 0.0091 -2.0007 0.250042 
RIW 5298 0.1380 19.3647 0.8587*** 0.7902 0.5369 9.5631 274.5883 0.288304 
HA 5298 0.0000 1.0000 0.0447*** 0.0000 0.2067 4.4059 17.4188 0.042741 
HB 5298 0.0000 1.0000 0.0393*** 0.0000 0.1942 4.7460 20.5325 0.037726 
HC 5298 0.0000 1.0000 0.1444*** 0.0000 0.3515 2.0240 2.0974 0.123568 
HD 5298 0.0000 1.0000 0.0664*** 0.0000 0.2491 3.4827 10.1330 0.062038 
HE 5298 0.0000 1.0000 0.0683*** 0.0000 0.2523 3.4228 9.7190 0.063671 
HF 5298 0.0000 1.0000 0.0028*** 0.0000 0.0531 18.7190 348.5328 0.002824 
ETLOS 5298 1.0000 31.4191 6.0280*** 5.6322 2.8041 1.1725 3.6805 7.863178 
Asterisks *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics  
This table contains summary statistics for the data for our atypical Sub Sample (Above Expected LOS + 0 Standard Deviations) 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis Variance 
Dependent                  
LOS 7369 2.0000 147.0000 15.0593*** 10.0000 15.7877 3.3198 14.3520 249.2515 
ReAd_LOS 7368 0.0000 148.0000 0.7599*** 0.0000 5.2003 12.3986 211.0443 27.0428 
Died 7369 0.0000 1.0000 0.0790*** 0.0000 0.2697 3.1227 7.7533 0.072752 
          
Control and Independent         
Hexp 7369 0.0000 44.0872 27.7341*** 38.3150 19.8300 -0.6659 -1.5206 393.229 
Hosp 7369 0.0000 1.0000 0.6637*** 1.0000 0.4725 -0.6933 -1.5198 0.223224 
Postchg 7369 0.0000 1.0000 0.1071*** 0.0000 0.3092 2.5421 4.4634 0.095619 
Abor 7369 0.0032 0.5824 0.1117*** 0.0978 0.0995 2.9655 10.8030 0.0099 
Educ 7369 0.2453 0.6633 0.4598*** 0.4133 0.0865 -0.0895 -0.7882 0.007486 
Age 7369 16.0000 103.0000 69.2097*** 74.0000 18.2964 -0.8058 -0.0464 334.758 
Fem 7369 0.0000 1.0000 0.5345*** 1.0000 0.4988 -0.1385 -1.9814 0.248841 
RIW 7369 0.2276 58.5834 2.1562*** 1.2639 3.0143 6.4418 67.6435 9.086161 
HA 7369 0.0000 1.0000 0.0687*** 0.0000 0.2529 3.4120 9.6443 0.06396 
HB 7369 0.0000 1.0000 0.0613*** 0.0000 0.2400 3.6570 11.3770 0.057583 
HC 7369 0.0000 1.0000 0.0984*** 0.0000 0.2979 2.6974 5.2777 0.088718 
HD 7369 0.0000 1.0000 0.0710*** 0.0000 0.2568 3.3423 9.1733 0.065945 
HE 7369 0.0000 1.0000 0.0658*** 0.0000 0.2480 3.5028 10.2721 0.061493 
HF 7369 0.0000 1.0000 0.0024*** 0.0000 0.0494 20.1633 404.6667 0.002437 
ETLOS 7369 1.0000 25.9706 5.1570*** 4.9000 2.4616 1.3510 3.3006 6.0593 
Asterisks *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics  
This table contains summary statistics for the fiscal years contained in the sample. 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis Variance 
Fiscal Year                 
2006-07 889 1 104 8.8459*** 6 9.7055 3.3571 17.2300 94.1958 
2007-08 3363 1 271 10.3321 6 15.4977 5.3535 46.4561 240.181 
2008-09 3050 1 206 11.6587*** 6 18.3163 4.3544 25.6891 335.4882 
2009-10 3135 1 257 10.0618 6 156.9904 12.5295 64.5848 156.9904 
2010-11 2240 1 199 9.4794** 6 11.2503 5.0138 50.4716 126.5695 
The fiscal year LOS means are tested to be statistically different from the entire sample mean. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 3: Pearson Correlation Matrix  
This table contains the pair wise correlation coefficients for variables. 
 hexp abor educ ave_inc Admit_ 
date 
Age fem RIW read_ 
LOS 
LOS Died Home Other cxlos ETLOS 
                
hexp 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
abor 0.00 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
educ 0.01 0.18 
*** 
1 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
ave_inc 0.02 
* 
0.07 
*** 
0.77 
*** 
1 . . . . . . . . . . . 
Admit_date 0.79 
*** 
0.00 -0.01 0.01 1 . . . . . . . . . . 
Age 0.00 -0.01 0.22 
*** 
0.20 
*** 
-0.01 1 . . . . . . . . . 
fem -0.01 0.01  
* 
0.08 
*** 
0.06 
*** 
0.00 0.08 
*** 
1 . . . . . . . . 
RIW 0.03 
*** 
0.04 
*** 
0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 
*** 
-0.02 
*** 
1 . . . . . . . 
read_LOS -0.01 0.01 0.02   
** 
0.01 -0.01 0.02* 0.00 0.00 1 . . . . . . 
LOS 0.02   
** 
0.01 0.06 
*** 
0.04 
*** 
-0.04 
*** 
0.12 
*** 
0.02 
*** 
0.77 
*** 
0.00 1 . . . . . 
Died 0.00 -0.01 0.04 
*** 
0.03 
*** 
-0.01 0.17 
*** 
-
0.02* 
0.10 
*** 
-0.04   
*** 
0.07  
*** 
1 . . . . 
Home -0.01 0.01 -0.09 
*** 
-0.08 
*** 
-0.01 -0.32 
*** 
-0.05 
*** 
-0.23 
*** 
-0.01 -0.28 
 *** 
-0.38 
*** 
1 . . . 
Dist_Other 0.01 -0.01 0.07 
*** 
0.07 
*** 
0.01 0.24 
*** 
0.06 
*** 
0.18 
*** 
0.03 
*** 
0.26  
*** 
-0.19 
*** 
-0.84 
*** 
1 . . 
cxlos 0.02   
** 
0.01 0.05** 0.04 
*** 
-0.04 
*** 
0.12 
*** 
0.02 
** 
0.78 
*** 
0.01 0.98  
*** 
0.07 
*** 
-0.27 
*** 
0.25 
*** 
1 . 
ETLOS 0.02* 0.00 0.10 
*** 
0.10 
*** 
0.01 0.33 
*** 
0.02* 0.17 
*** 
0.01 0.19  
*** 
0.15 
*** 
-0.24 
*** 
0.17 
*** 
0.19 
*** 
1 
Asterisks *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 4.1: Atypical - Above ELOS + 0 Standard Deviations 
 
1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Ln(LOS) 
          
Hosp 0.06280*** 
   
 
(0.0172) 
   HExp 
 
0.0016*** 
 
 
  
(0.0004) 
 
 
Admit_Date 
  
0.0081***  
   
(0.0019)  
Admit_Date^2   -2.280E-7***  
   (5.028E-8)  
PostChg 
   
-0.0433 
    
(0.0309) 
ERIW 0.6189*** 0.6189*** 0.6178*** 0.5792*** 
 (0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0334) 
Educ 0.2486*** 0.2480*** 0.2332*** 0.2349 
 
(0.0992) (0.0992) (0.0908) (0.1805) 
Abor 0.0348 0.0346 0.0392 0.0913 
 (0.0775) (0.0775) (0.0775) (0.1534) 
Age 0.0061*** 0.0061*** 0.0061*** 0.0042*** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0009) 
Female 0.0159 0.0160 0.0163 -0.0071 
 
(0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0311) 
HA 0.0466 0.0467 0.0256 0.2630 
 
(0.0339) (0.0339) (0.0340) (0.4413) 
HB 0.0445 0.0443 0.0398 0.0138 
 
(0.0310) (0.0310) (0.0310) (0.0636) 
HC 0.0066 0.0065 0.0017 -0.0387 
 
(0.0284) (0.0284) (0.0284) (0.0517) 
HD 0.0837*** 0.0838*** 0.0838*** 0.1338** 
 
(0.0315) (0.0315) (0.0315) (0.0548) 
HE -0.0628** -0.0634** -0.0818**  
 
(0.0316) (0.0316) (0.0321)  
HF -0.1505 -0.1502 -0.1959  
 
(0.1338) (0.1338) (0.1328)  
Constant 1.2090*** 1.2078*** -71.4286*** 1.4416*** 
 (0.0497) (0.0497) (16.0543) (0.0947) 
     
Observations 7369 7369 7369 1636 
R-Squared 0.2105 0.2106 0.2111 0.1953 
F-Value 163.43 163.43 151.43 32.83 
Prob (F-Stat) <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
     
     
     
This table presents Ordinary Least Squares regression estimation. The dependent variable is the difference 
between initial admission length of stay per patient and the national average given the patients age, gender, and 
diagnosis. The test variables are HOSP, HEXP, ADMIT_DATE, and POSTCHG. Refer to appendix for variable 
descriptions. Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 4.2: Atypical - Above ELOS + 1 Standard Deviation 
 
1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Ln(LOS) 
          
Hosp 0.03906** 
   
 
(0.0188) 
   HExp 
 
0.0010** 
 
 
  
(0.0004) 
 
 
Admit_Date 
  
0.0235***  
   
(0.0043)  
Admit_Date^2   -2.962E-7***  
   (5.338E-8)  
PostChg 
   
-0.0343 
    
(0.0315) 
ERIW 0.4678*** 0.4676*** 0.4640*** 0.4473*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0187) (0.0343) 
Educ 0.1425 0.1421 0.1252 0.0906 
 
(0.0965) (0.0965) (0.0965) (0.1874) 
Abor 0.0168 0.0161 0.0270 -0.0118 
 (0.0810) (0.0810) (0.0812) (0.1599) 
Age 0.0033*** 0.0033*** 0.0033*** 0.0004 
 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0009) 
Female -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0008 -0.0317 
 
(0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0169) (0.0318) 
HA 0.0062 0.0074 -0.0254 -0.0625 
 
(0.0380) (0.0380) (0.0380) (0.3713) 
HB -0.0277 -0.0278 -0.0358 -0.0734 
 
(0.0338) (0.0338) (0.0336) (0.0635) 
HC 0.0454 0.0454 0.0365 0.0050 
 
(0.0302) (0.0302) (0.0301) (0.0546) 
HD 0.0377 0.0379 0.0410 -0.0246 
 
(0.0320) (0.0320) (0.0317) (0.0516) 
HE -0.0228 -0.0229 -0.0557  
 
(0.0356) (0.0356) (0.0362)  
HF -0.1504 -0.1497 -0.2127  
 
(0.1362) (0.1366) (0.1350)  
Constant 1.9458*** 1.9433*** -464.535*** 2.2046*** 
 (0.0537) (0.0537) (84.514) (0.0987) 
     
Observations 4901 4901 4901 1109 
R-Squared 0.1567 0.1569 0.1620 0.1544 
F-Value 75.69 75.79 72.69 16.68 
Prob (F-Stat) <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
     
     
     
This table presents Ordinary Least Squares regression estimation. The dependent variable is the difference 
between initial admission length of stay per patient and the national average given the patients age, gender, and 
diagnosis. The test variables are HOSP, HEXP, ADMIT_DATE, and POSTCHG. Refer to appendix for variable 
descriptions. Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 4.3: Atypical - Above ELOS + 2 Standard Deviations 
 
1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Ln(LOS) 
          
Hosp 0.0221 
   
 
(0.0211) 
   HExp 
 
0.0006 
 
 
  
(0.0005) 
 
 
Admit_Date 
  
0.0243***  
   
(0.0046)  
Admit_Date^2   -3.068E-7***  
   (5.819E-8)  
PostChg 
   
-0.0178 
    
(0.0338) 
ERIW 0.3775*** 0.3774*** 0.3734*** 0.3393*** 
 (0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0352)  
Educ 0.1242 0.1237 0.1080 0.0556 
 
(0.1065) (0.1065) (0.1062) (0.1971) 
Abor -0.0444 -0.0451 -0.0321 -0.0725 
 (0.0883) (0.0883) (0.0879) (0.1703) 
Age 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0016 
 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0010) 
Female -0.0149 -0.0149 -0.0153 -0.0324 
 
(0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0185) (0.0342) 
HA 0.0693 0.0705 0.0351 0.1709 
 
(0.0444) (0.0443) (0.0443) (0.4711) 
HB -0.0276 -0.0276 -0.0390 -0.0786 
 
(0.0382) (0.0382) (0.0378) (0.0701) 
HC 0.0447 0.0447 0.0337 0.0147 
 
(0.0320) (0.0320) (0.0318) (0.0592) 
HD 0.0206 0.0207 0.0225 -0.0461 
 
(0.0344) (0.0344) (0.0340) (0.0551) 
HE 0.0331 0.0331 -0.0039  
 
(0.0400) (0.0400) (0.0407)  
HF -0.2677 -0.2670 -0.3350**  
 
(0.1652) (0.1655) (0.1646)  
Constant 2.4265*** 2.4246*** -479.71*** 2.7014*** 
 (0.0593) (0.0593) (92.135) (0.1064) 
     
Observations 3463 3463 3463 779 
R-Squared 0.1241 0.1242 0.1333 0.1183 
F-Value 40.75 40.79 40.82 8.56 
Prob (F-Stat) <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
     
     
     
This table presents Ordinary Least Squares regression estimation. The dependent variable is the difference 
between initial admission length of stay per patient and the national average given the patients age, gender, and 
diagnosis. The test variables are HOSP, HEXP, ADMIT_DATE, and POSTCHG. Refer to appendix for variable 
descriptions. Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 4.4: Below ELOS + 0 Standard Deviations 
 
5 6 7 8 
VARIABLES Ln(LOS) 
          
Hosp 0.0001 
   
 
(0.0159) 
   HExp 
 
0.00003 
 
 
  
(0.0004) 
 
 
Admit_Date 
  
0.0003  
   
(0.0018)  
Admit_Date^2   -8.926E-9  
   (4.935E-8)  
PostChg 
   
-0.0677* 
    
(0.0337) 
ERIW 0.5297*** 0.5298*** 0.5295*** 0.5592*** 
 (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0342) 
Educ 0.2415*** 0.2413*** 0.2414*** 0.3347* 
 
(0.0904) (0.0904) (0.0903) (0.2011) 
Abor -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0023 0.1959 
 (0.0824) (0.0824) (0.0825) (0.1917) 
Age 0.0046*** 0.0046*** 0.0046*** 0.0033*** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0009) 
Female 0.0008 0.0008 0.0014 0.0406 
 
(0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0339) 
HA 0.1600*** 0.1604*** 0.1559*** 0.4891 
 
(0.0347) (0.0347) (0.0348) (0.5621) 
HB 0.0377 0.0377 0.0377 0.0918 
 
(0.0385) (0.0385) (0.0385) (0.0819) 
HC -0.0722*** -0.0721*** -0.0733*** -0.0455 
 
(0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0509) 
HD 0.0240 0.0240 0.0242 -0.0579 
 
(0.0295) (0.0295) (0.0295) (0.0587) 
HE -0.0054 -0.0053 -0.0096  
 
(0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0289)  
HF -0.0669 -0.0669 -0.0712  
 
(0.1125) (0.1125) (0.1128)  
Constant 0.0403 0.0395 -2.4416 0.0581 
 (0.0456) (0.0456) (15.744) (0.1005) 
     
Observations 5298 5298 5298 1108 
R-Squared 0.2689 0.2689 0.2690 0.2693 
F-Value 162.03 162.03 149.54 33.63 
Prob (F-Stat) <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
     
     
     
This table presents Ordinary Least Squares regression estimation. The dependent variable is the difference 
between initial admission length of stay per patient and the national average given the patients age, gender, and 
diagnosis. The test variables are HOSP, HEXP, ADMIT_DATE, and POSTCHG. Refer to appendix for variable 
descriptions. Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 4.5: Below ELOS + 1 Standard Deviation 
 
5 6 7 8 
VARIABLES Ln(LOS) 
          
Hosp -0.0180 
   
 
(0.0144) 
   HExp 
 
-0.00004 
 
 
  
(0.0003) 
 
 
Admit_Date 
  
-0.0067*  
   
(0.0035)  
Admit_Date^2   8.406E-8  
   (4.447E-8)  
PostChg 
   
-0.0549* 
    
(0.0301) 
ERIW 0.4036*** 0.4036*** 0.4041*** 0.4433*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0308) 
Educ 0.0969 0.0971 0.1014 0.0586 
 
(0.0816) (0.0816) (0.0816) (0.1768) 
Abor 0.0791 0.0790 0.0807 0.3204** 
 (0.0722) (0.0722) (0.0722) (0.1607) 
Age 0.0047*** 0.0047*** 0.0047*** 0.0041*** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0008) 
Female 0.0205 0.0205 0.0200 0.0295 
 
(0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0302) 
HA 0.1717*** 0.1720*** 0.1740*** -0.7832 
 
(0.0285) (0.0285) (0.0285) (0.6087) 
HB 0.1176*** 0.1176*** 0.1184*** 0.1401** 
 
(0.0337) (0.0337) (0.0337) (0.0701) 
HC -0.1269*** -0.1269*** -0.1257*** -0.0647 
 
(0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0460) 
HD -0.0124 -0.0124 -0.0120 -0.1441** 
 
(0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.02563) 
HE 0.0154 0.0156 0.0182  
 
(0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0260)  
HF -0.0503 -0.0502 -0.0398  
 
(0.1143) (0.1143) (0.1143)  
Constant 0.4698*** 0.4696*** 134.002* 0.4907*** 
 (0.0416) (0.0416) (0.0416) (0.0897) 
     
Observations 7766 7766 7766 1635 
R-Squared 0.1644 0.1644 0.1647 0.1793 
F-Value 127.14 127.14 117.60 29.55 
Prob (F-Stat) <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
     
     
     
This table presents Ordinary Least Squares regression estimation. The dependent variable is the difference 
between initial admission length of stay per patient and the national average given the patients age, gender, and 
diagnosis. The test variables are HOSP, HEXP, ADMIT_DATE, and POSTCHG. Refer to appendix for variable 
descriptions. Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 4.6: Below ELOS + 2 Standard Deviations 
 
5 6 7 8 
VARIABLES Ln(LOS) 
          
Hosp -0.0119 
   
 
(0.0143) 
   HExp 
 
-0.0003 
 
 
  
(0.0003) 
 
 
Admit_Date 
  
-0.0090**  
   
(0.0035)  
Admit_Date^2   1.133E-7**  
   (4.09E-8)  
PostChg 
   
-0.0607** 
    
(0.0297) 
ERIW 0.3476*** 0.3476*** 0.3483*** 0.3598*** 
 (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0312) 
Educ 0.0936 0.0938 0.0999 0.0238 
 
(0.0811) (0.0811) (0.0811) (01765) 
Abor 0.0715 0.0714 0.0733 0.3479** 
 (0.0708) (0.0708) (0.0706) (0.1583) 
Age 0.0051*** 0.0051*** 0.0051*** 0.0052*** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0008) 
Female 0.0289** 0.0289** 0.0280** 0.0395 
 
(0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0299) 
HA 0.2053*** 0.2050*** 0.2097*** 0.0102 
 
(0.0271) (0.0271) (0.0271) (0.4667) 
HB 0.1590*** 0.1591*** 0.1601*** 0.1915*** 
 
(0.0318) (0.0318) (0.0318) (0.0667) 
HC -0.1555*** -0.1555*** -0.1535*** -0.0781* 
 
(0.0210) (0.0210) (0.0210) (0.0462) 
HD 0.0038 0.0038 0.0039 -0.0645 
 
(0.0272) (0.0272) (0.0273) (0.0545) 
HE 0.0164 0.0165 0.0228 
 
 
(0.0259) (0.0259) (0.0262) 
 HF -0.0826 -0.0826 -0.0657 
 
 
(0.1199) (0.1199) (0.1202) 
 Constant 0.6321*** 0.6329*** 179.914*** 0.6557*** 
 (0.0417) (0.0417) (69.760) (0.0894) 
     
Observations 9204 9204 9204 1965 
R-Squared 0.1259 0.1260 0.1265 0.1268 
F-Value 110.36 110.38 102.40 23.61 
Prob (F-Stat) <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
     
     
     
This table presents Ordinary Least Squares regression estimation. The dependent variable is the difference 
between initial admission length of stay per patient and the national average given the patients age, gender, and 
diagnosis. The test variables are HOSP, HEXP, ADMIT_DATE, and POSTCHG. Refer to appendix for variable 
descriptions. Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 5.1: Final Time period of Sample  
 9 
VARIABLES Ln(LOS) 
  
Admit_Date -0.00046*** 
 (0.00014) 
ERIW 0.3806*** 
 (0.0330) 
Educ 0.0753 
 (0.1781) 
Abor 0.5332*** 
 (0.1412) 
Age 0.0070*** 
 (0.0009) 
Female -0.0400 
 (0.0308) 
Constant 9.0281*** 
 (2.5556) 
  
Observations 3483 
R-Squared 0.0848 
F-Value 53.65 
Prob (F-Stat) <.0001 
  
  
  
This table presents Ordinary Least Squares regression estimation. The dependent variable is the difference 
between initial admission length of stay per patient and the national average given the patients age, gender, and 
diagnosis. The test variable is ADMIT_DATE. Refer to appendix for variable descriptions. Regressions are 
estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 5.2: Hospitalist time effect on LOS  
 9 
VARIABLES Ln(LOS) 
  
Admit_Date -0.00016*** 
 (0.00004) 
Hosp_admit_date 0.000007*** 
 (0.00000) 
ERIW 0.38510*** 
 (0.0341) 
Hosp_ERIW 0.02260 
 (0.0408) 
Educ 0.5278*** 
 (0.1671) 
Hosp_Educ -0.3240 
 (0.2064) 
Abor -0.04344 
 (0.1446) 
Hosp_Abor 0.2801 
 (0.1776) 
Age 0.00855*** 
 (0.0008) 
Hosp_Age -0.00087 
 (0.0010) 
Female 0.03769 
 (0.0281) 
 0.01921 
 (0.0349) 
Constant 6.7991*** 
 (1.3936) 
  
Observations 12667 
R-Squared 0.0904 
F-Value 104.74 
Prob (F-Stat) <.0001 
  
  
  
This table presents Ordinary Least Squares regression estimation. The dependent variable is the difference 
between initial admission length of stay per patient and the national average given the patients age, gender, and 
diagnosis. The test variable is ADMIT_DATE. Refer to appendix for variable descriptions. Regressions are 
estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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 Table 6: Readmission 
  13 14 15 16 
VARIABLES ReAd_LOS 
          
HExp  -0.0022    
 (0.0020)    
Hosp  -0.0875   
  (0.0856)   
Admit_Date   -0.0000  
   (0.0001)  
PostChg    0.2061 
    (0.1232) 
Abor -0.3247 -0.3248 -0.3232 -0.3223 
 (0.4471) (0.4471) (0.4468) (0.4467) 
Educ 0.4162 0.4151 0.4074 0.4233 
 (0.4881) (0.4881) (0.4878) (0.4876) 
Age 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 
 (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
Female -0.1208 -0.1205 -0.1201 -0.1222 
 (0.0809) (0.0809) (0.0809) (0.0809) 
RIW -0.0343 -0.0343 -0.0350 -0.0348 
 (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0217) 
HA -0.2256 -0.2254 -0.1983 -0.1660 
 (0.1962) (0.1963) (0.1972) (0.1946) 
HB 0.0339 0.0339 0.0318 0.0334 
 (0.1863) (0.1863) (0.1863) (0.1863) 
HC 0.3026*** 0.3026*** 0.3067*** 0.3148*** 
 (0.1174) (0.1174) (0.1174) (0.1174) 
HD 0.2357 0.2358 0.2341 0.2325 
 (0.1512) (0.1512) (0.1512) (0.1512) 
HE 0.0875 0.0866 0.0944 0.1254 
 (0.1621) (0.1622) (0.1635) (0.1629) 
HF 0.1222** 0.1222** 0.1232** 0.1263*** 
 (0.4889) (0.4889) (0.4893) (0.4890) 
Constant -2.9789*** -2.9799*** -2.8007 -3.0707*** 
 (0.2503) (0.2503) (1.7808) (0.2452) 
     
Observations 12667 12667 12667 12667 
AIC 5146.26 5146.27 5146.27 5146.78 
Likelihood Ratio 23.47 21.95 20.94 23.48 
Likelihood (DF) 13 13 13 13 
Pr  > ChiSq 0.0364 0.0380 0.0513 0.0239 
This table presents Binary Logistic regression estimation. The dependent variable is the inpatient readmission rate. 
The test variables are HOSP, HEXP, ADMIT_DATE, and POSTCHG. Refer to appendix for variable 
descriptions. Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 7: Mortality 
  9 10 11 12 
VARIABLES MORT 
          
HExp  0.0000    
 (0.0017)    
Hosp  0.0011   
  (0.0732)   
Admit_Date   -0.0000  
   (0.0000)  
PostChg    0.0354 
    (0.1104) 
RIW 0.1039*** 0.1039*** 0.1038*** 0.1039*** 
 (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0099) 
Abor -0.5041       -0.5041       -0.5032       -0.5040       
 (0.3992) (0.3992) (0.3993) (0.3992) 
Educ 0.0938 0.0938 0.0946 0.0967 
 (0.4025) (0.4024) (0.4025) (0.4024) 
Age 0.0485*** 0.0485*** 0.0485*** 0.0485*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
Female -0.2608*** -0.2608*** -0.2606*** -0.2612*** 
 (0.0685) (0.0685) (0.0685) (0.0685) 
HA 0.1413 0.1414 0.1277 0.1454 
 (0.1345) (0.1347) (0.1357) (0.1327) 
HB 0.0637 0.0637 0.0627 0.0634 
 (0.1465) (0.1465) (0.1466) (0.1465) 
HC -0.0626 -0.0626 -0.0647 -0.0616 
 (0.1121) (0.1121) (0.1122) (0.1121) 
HD -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0031 -0.0027 
 (0.1316) (0.1316) (0.1316) (0.1316) 
HE -0.0590 -0.0590 -0.0678 -0.0546 
 (0.1427) (0.1427) (0.1439) (0.1431) 
HF 0.4216 0.4216 0.4129 0.4261 
 (0.6217) (0.6217) (0.6220) (0.6219) 
Constant -6.1305*** -6.1306*** -5.5073*** -6.1355*** 
 (0.2607) (0.2608) (1.5179) (0.2574) 
     
Observations 12667 12667 12667 12667 
AIC 7003.80 7003.80 7003.80 7003.80 
Likelihood Ratio 564.57 564.57 564.74 564.67 
Likelihood (DF) 12 12 12 12 
Pr  > ChiSq <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
This table presents Binary Logistic regression estimation. The dependent variable is the inpatient raw mortality 
rate. The test variables are HOSP, HEXP, ADMIT_DATE, and POSTCHG. Refer to appendix for variable 
descriptions. Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Costs: Stipend 
(48 weeks)
Patients 
Cared for 
at a time 
(20-25)
Average 
LOS
Total LOS 
Days 
Billed
GP Hospital Care 
Fee ($30.20 perday)
# of patient 
seen in 48 
weeks
Hospital 
Discharge Fee 
($12.10)
Total FFS Earned
312,000.00$     20 9.631515 336 202,737.61$             697 8,433.70$              523,171.31$            
312,000.00$     21 9.631515 336 212,918.12$             732 8,857.20$              533,775.32$            
312,000.00$     22 9.631515 336 223,098.63$             767 9,280.70$              544,379.33$            
312,000.00$     23 9.631515 336 233,279.15$             802 9,704.20$              554,983.35$            
312,000.00$     24 9.631515 336 243,459.66$             837 10,127.70$            565,587.36$            
312,000.00$     25 9.631515 336 253,640.17$             872 10,551.20$            576,191.37$            
Table 8.1 Current Annual Average LOS
Costs: Stipend 
(48 weeks)
Patients 
Cared for 
at a time 
(20-25)
Average 
LOS
Total LOS 
Days 
Billed
GP Hospital Care 
Fee ($30.20 perday)
# of patient 
seen in 48 
weeks
Hospital 
Discharge Fee 
($12.10)
Total FFS Earned
Change in 
FFS
# of new 
patients 
seen
Cost per 
Patient
"Benefits"
312,000.00$     20 8.130 336 202,795.59$             826 9,994.60$              212,790.19$            (310,381.12)$ 129 290.87$           39,083.36$           
312,000.00$     21 8.130 336 212,861.72$             867 10,490.70$            223,352.42$            (310,422.90)$ 135 290.87$           40,901.19$           
312,000.00$     22 8.130 336 223,173.36$             909 10,998.90$            234,172.26$            (310,207.07)$ 142 290.87$           43,021.99$           
312,000.00$     23 8.130 336 233,239.49$             950 11,495.00$            244,734.49$            (310,248.86)$ 148 290.87$           44,839.82$           
312,000.00$     24 8.130 336 243,305.61$             991 11,991.10$            255,296.71$            (310,290.65)$ 154 290.87$           46,657.65$           
312,000.00$     25 8.130 336 253,617.25$             1033 12,499.30$            266,116.55$            (310,074.82)$ 161 290.87$           48,778.45$           
 Table 8.2 Forecasted Decrease in LOS by 15.59%
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Stipend (48 
weeks)
Patients 
Cared for 
at a time 
(20-25)
Average 
 LOS (A-
typical)
Total LOS 
Days 
Billed
GP Hospital Care 
(Average)
# of patient 
seen in 48 
weeks (Ave)
Hospital 
Discharge 
($12.10) (A-Typ)
Total FFS Earned
312,000.00$     20 4.970992 136 81,817.56$               545 6,594.50$              88,412.06$              
312,000.00$     21 4.970992 136 86,021.03$               573 6,933.30$              92,954.33$              
312,000.00$     22 4.970992 136 90,074.38$               600 7,260.00$              97,334.38$              
312,000.00$     23 4.970992 136 94,127.73$               627 7,586.70$              101,714.43$            
312,000.00$     24 4.970992 136 98,331.20$               655 7,925.50$              106,256.70$            
312,000.00$     25 4.970992 136 102,384.55$             682 8,252.20$              110,636.75$            
Table 8.3 Pre Payment Change Average Typical LOS (Below 0 Standard Deviations)
Stipend (48 
weeks)
Patients 
Cared for 
at a time 
(20-25)
Average 
 LOS (A-
typical)
Total LOS 
Days 
Billed
GP Hospital Care 
(Average)
# of patient 
seen in 48 
weeks (Ave)
Hospital 
Discharge 
($12.10) (A-Typ)
Total FFS Earned
# of new 
patients seen
Cost per 
Patient
"Benefits"
312,000.00$     20 4.669253 136 81,927.65$               581 7,030.10$              88,957.75$              36 150.123969 5,840.06$        
312,000.00$     21 4.669253 136 86,016.98$               610 7,381.00$              93,397.98$              37 150.123969 6,002.29$        
312,000.00$     22 4.669253 136 90,106.31$               639 7,731.90$              97,838.21$              39 150.123969 6,326.73$        
312,000.00$     23 4.669253 136 94,195.64$               668 8,082.80$              102,278.44$            41 150.123969 6,651.18$        
312,000.00$     24 4.669253 136 98,284.98$               697 8,433.70$              106,718.68$            42 150.123969 6,813.41$        
312,000.00$     25 4.669253 136 102,374.31$             726 8,784.60$              111,158.91$            44 150.123969 7,137.85$        
Table 8.4 Post Payment Change Average LOS 6.07% Decrease (Typical observations Below 0 Standard Deviation)
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Stipend (48 
weeks)
Patients 
Cared for 
at a time 
(20-25)
Average 
 LOS (A-
typical)
Total LOS 
Days 
Billed
GP Hospital Care 
(Average)
# of patient 
seen in 48 
weeks (Ave)
Hospital 
Discharge 
($12.10) (A-Typ)
Total FFS Earned
312,000.00$     20 4.217125 200 120,861.97$             949 11,482.90$            132,344.87$            
312,000.00$     21 4.217125 200 126,847.76$             996 12,051.60$            138,899.36$            
312,000.00$     22 4.217125 200 132,960.90$             1044 12,632.40$            145,593.30$            
312,000.00$     23 4.217125 200 138,946.69$             1091 13,201.10$            152,147.79$            
312,000.00$     24 4.217125 200 145,059.84$             1139 13,781.90$            158,841.74$            
312,000.00$     25 4.217125 200 151,045.62$             1186 14,350.60$            165,396.22$            
Table 8.5 Pre Payment Change Average Typical LOS  (Below +1 Standard Deviations)
Stipend (48 
weeks)
Patients 
Cared for 
at a time 
(20-25)
Average 
 LOS (A-
typical)
Total LOS 
Days 
Billed
GP Hospital Care 
(Average)
# of patient 
seen in 48 
weeks (Ave)
Hospital 
Discharge 
($12.10) (A-Typ)
Total FFS Earned
# of new 
patients seen
Cost per 
Patient
"Benefits"
312,000.00$     20 3.985605 200 120,846.74$             1004 12,148.40$            132,995.14$            55 127.357187 7,670.15$        
312,000.00$     21 3.985605 200 126,865.00$             1054 12,753.40$            139,618.40$            58 127.357187 8,088.52$        
312,000.00$     22 3.985605 200 133,003.63$             1105 13,370.50$            146,374.13$            61 127.357187 8,506.89$        
312,000.00$     23 3.985605 200 139,021.89$             1155 13,975.50$            152,997.39$            64 127.357187 8,925.26$        
312,000.00$     24 3.985605 200 145,040.16$             1205 14,580.50$            159,620.66$            66 127.357187 9,204.17$        
312,000.00$     25 3.985605 200 151,058.42$             1255 15,185.50$            166,243.92$            69 127.357187 9,622.55$        
Table 8.6 Post Payment Change Average Typical LOS 5.49% Decrease  (Typical observations Below + 1 Standard Deviation)
  
7
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Stipend (48 
weeks)
Patients 
Cared for 
at a time 
(20-25)
Average 
 LOS (A-
typical)
Total LOS 
Days 
Billed
GP Hospital Care 
(Average)
# of patient 
seen in 48 
weeks (Ave)
Hospital 
Discharge 
($12.10) (A-Typ)
Total FFS Earned
312,000.00$     20 3.378159 241 145,277.05$             1424 17,230.40$            162,507.45$            
312,000.00$     21 3.378159 241 152,520.49$             1495 18,089.50$            170,609.99$            
312,000.00$     22 3.378159 241 159,763.94$             1566 18,948.60$            178,712.54$            
312,000.00$     23 3.378159 241 167,109.41$             1638 19,819.80$            186,929.21$            
312,000.00$     24 3.378159 241 174,352.86$             1709 20,678.90$            195,031.76$            
312,000.00$     25 3.378159 241 181,596.31$             1780 21,538.00$            203,134.31$            
Table 8.7 Pre Payment Change Average Typical LOS (Below + 2 Standard Deviations)
Stipend (48 
weeks)
Patients 
Cared for 
at a time 
(20-25)
Average 
 LOS (A-
typical)
Total LOS 
Days 
Billed
GP Hospital Care 
(Average)
# of patient 
seen in 48 
weeks (Ave)
Hospital 
Discharge 
($12.10) (A-Typ)
Total FFS Earned
# of new 
patients seen
Cost per 
Patient
"Benefits"
312,000.00$     20 3.149457 241 145,238.49$             1527 18,476.70$            163,715.19$            103 102.020397 11,754.40$      
312,000.00$     21 3.149457 241 152,562.24$             1604 19,408.40$            171,970.64$            109 102.020397 12,439.12$      
312,000.00$     22 3.149457 241 159,790.88$             1680 20,328.00$            180,118.88$            114 102.020397 13,009.73$      
312,000.00$     23 3.149457 241 167,114.62$             1757 21,259.70$            188,374.32$            119 102.020397 13,580.33$      
312,000.00$     24 3.149457 241 174,343.26$             1833 22,179.30$            196,522.56$            124 102.020397 14,150.93$      
312,000.00$     25 3.149457 241 181,571.89$             1909 23,098.90$            204,670.79$            129 102.020397 14,721.53$      
Table 8.8 Post Payment Change Average Typical LOS 6.77% Decrease  (Typical observations Below + 2 Standard Deviation)
  
7
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Stipend (48 
weeks)
Patients 
Cared for 
at a time 
(20-25)
Average 
LOS (A-
typical)
Total LOS 
Days 
Billed
GP Hospital Care 
(Average)
# of patient 
seen in 48 
weeks (Ave)
Hospital 
Discharge 
($12.10) (A-Typ)
Total FFS Earned
-$                  20 15.0593 195.467277 117,790.83$             259 3,133.90$              120,924.73$            
-$                  21 15.0593 195.467277 123,703.11$             272 3,291.20$              126,994.31$            
-$                  22 15.0593 195.467277 129,615.40$             285 3,448.50$              133,063.90$            
-$                  23 15.0593 195.467277 135,527.68$             298 3,605.80$              139,133.48$            
-$                  24 15.0593 195.467277 141,439.96$             311 3,763.10$              145,203.06$            
-$                  25 15.0593 195.467277 147,352.24$             324 3,920.40$              151,272.64$            
Table 8.9 Pre Hospitalist Average Atypical LOS (Atypical observations over 0 Standard Deviation)
Stipend (48 
weeks)
Patients 
Cared for 
at a time 
(20-25)
Average 
LOS (A-
typical)
Total LOS 
Days 
Billed
GP Hospital Care 
(Average)
# of patient 
seen in 48 
weeks (Ave)
Hospital 
Discharge 
($12.10) (A-Typ)
Total FFS Earned
# of new 
patients seen
Cost per 
Patient
"Benefits"
312,000.00$     20 16.00502 195.467277 117,937.82$             244 2,952.40$              120,890.22$            -15 454.79086 (319,003.36)$   
312,000.00$     21 16.00502 195.467277 123,738.04$             256 3,097.60$              126,835.64$            -16 454.79086 (319,470.25)$   
312,000.00$     22 16.00502 195.467277 129,538.26$             268 3,242.80$              132,781.06$            -17 454.79086 (319,937.14)$   
312,000.00$     23 16.00502 195.467277 135,338.48$             280 3,388.00$              138,726.48$            -18 454.79086 (320,404.04)$   
312,000.00$     24 16.00502 195.467277 141,622.06$             293 3,545.30$              145,167.36$            -18 454.79086 (320,404.04)$   
312,000.00$     25 16.00502 195.467277 147,422.28$             305 3,690.50$              151,112.78$            -19 454.79086 (320,870.93)$   
Table 8.10 Hospitalist Average LOS 6.28% Increase (Atypical observations over 0 Standard Deviation)
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Stipend (48 
weeks)
Patients 
Cared for 
at a time 
(20-25)
Average 
LOS (A-
typical)
Total LOS 
Days 
Billed
GP Hospital Care 
(Average)
# of patient 
seen in 48 
weeks (Ave)
Hospital 
Discharge 
($12.10) (A-Typ)
Total FFS Earned
-$                  20 19.7174 130 78,005.98$               131 1,585.10$              79,591.08$              
-$                  21 19.7174 130 82,174.24$               138 1,669.80$              83,844.04$              
-$                  22 19.7174 130 86,342.49$               145 1,754.50$              88,096.99$              
-$                  23 19.7174 130 89,915.29$               151 1,827.10$              91,742.39$              
-$                  24 19.7174 130 94,083.55$               158 1,911.80$              95,995.35$              
-$                  25 19.7174 130 97,656.34$               164 1,984.40$              99,640.74$              
Table 8.11 Pre Hospitalist Average Atypical LOS (Atypical observations over 1 Standard Deviation)
Stipend (48 
weeks)
Patients 
Cared for 
at a time 
(20-25)
Average 
LOS (A-
typical)
Total LOS 
Days 
Billed
GP Hospital Care 
(Average)
# of patient 
seen in 48 
weeks (Ave)
Hospital 
Discharge 
($12.10) (A-Typ)
Total FFS Earned
# of new 
patients seen
Cost per 
Patient
"Benefits"
312,000.00$     20 20.48756 130 77,959.27$               126 1,524.60$              79,483.87$              -5 595.46548 (315,037.83)$   
312,000.00$     21 20.48756 130 82,290.34$               133 1,609.30$              83,899.64$              -5 595.46548 (315,037.83)$   
312,000.00$     22 20.48756 130 86,002.69$               139 1,681.90$              87,684.59$              -6 595.46548 (315,645.39)$   
312,000.00$     23 20.48756 130 89,715.03$               145 1,754.50$              91,469.53$              -6 595.46548 (315,645.39)$   
312,000.00$     24 20.48756 130 94,046.10$               152 1,839.20$              95,885.30$              -6 595.46548 (315,645.39)$   
312,000.00$     25 20.48756 130 97,758.45$               158 1,911.80$              99,670.25$              -6 595.46548 (315,645.39)$   
Table 8.12 Hospitalist Average LOS 3.906% Increase (Atypical observations over 1 Standard Deviation)
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